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  ABSTRACT 
This dissertation explores changes in fertility and family formation in South 
Korea, a setting in which rapid demographic changes have taken place since the early 
twentieth century. Despite active debate and discussion among experts and policymakers, 
knowledge is still limited in regards to the country’s significant demographic changes. I 
take advantage of Korean census samples data from 1966 to 2010, which span birth 
cohorts from pre- and early-transitional stages to post-transitional stages, which comprise 
the entry stage of the second demographic transition. From a cohort perspective, I use 
diverse demographic methods to analyze three different aspects of fertility and family 
formation—fertility differentials, marriage delay, and fertility concentration.  
The findings illustrate how fertility and marriage patterns have changed over 
generations and range from a politically tumultuous period, which includes World War II, 
liberation, and the Korean War, to an advanced economic period. By and large, the three 
studies suggest that until 1960, fertility and family formation converged as per social 
norms and leadership guidelines. Then, marriage and childbearing behaviors began to 
diversify and variation by social groups increased for cohorts born during and after the 
1960s. The phrase “convergence towards diversity” captures the reversal of demographic 
trends within the country. Taken together, this dissertation advances our understanding of 
how fertility and family formation have changed in South Korea, which has been on an 
intense demographic journey from pre-transitional fertility through very low fertility, and 
currently headed toward another destination. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Across Europe and East Asia, fertility has dropped below replacement levels 
while marriage has simultaneously declined. Variation exists between countries in exact 
patterns, but the overall trend has been consistent in the past decades. The combination of 
(very) low fertility and the decline of marriage is one of the major features that 
characterize what demographers call the Second Demographic Transition. The second 
demographic transition was originally intended to explain the shared demographic 
changes in fertility, family, and partnership-related behaviors that have occurred in 
Western and Northern Europe since the 1960s (Lesthaeghe & van de Kaa, 1986). Despite 
debates about its ambiguity, the theory is widely accepted to describe similar changes in 
Southern and Eastern European countries and frequently used to describe demographic 
changes in the rest of world, particularly in East Asia. East Asian countries, including 
South Korea, share key forces that have caused low fertility and marriage decline, 
including, for example, extended education, an increase in women’s social participation, 
postponement of marriage, and economic constraints.  
One of the ongoing debates about the second demographic transition theory is 
whether the demographic trends observed in Europe will spread to other parts of the 
world. It might be naïve to expect that the European experience would be exactly 
replicated in other regions. Although classical demographic transition theory has been 
widely accepted, it has several flaws that have invited criticism. In particular, some of the 
theory’s major assumptions have not always been satisfied. For instance, in a few places, 
mortality decline did not precede fertility decline, and economic development was not 
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necessarily required for the onset of the demographic transition. Moreover, government 
support such as family-planning programs and unprecedented contagious diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS, which were not considered in the theory’s initial form, often accelerate or 
delay fertility decline.  
These transition theories should therefore be taken as a description of 
demographic ebb and flow. Since diverse backgrounds generate differences in 
demographic progress and outcomes, it is hard to conceive of a single predetermined 
pathway across various regions and contexts. Accordingly, the theories should consider 
distinct characteristics of regions and countries. For instance, even among countries that 
are well ahead in the second demographic transition, a few contradictory characteristics 
have been observed such as near replacement fertility in the U.S., a lower level of out-of-
wedlock births in Southern Europe, and rapid shifts in fertility driven by economic 
constraints, rather than value changes, in former socialist states. The differences across 
European countries are substantial and deeply rooted in culture and history; thus, the 
eventual convergence of demographic characteristics will likely not occur in the near 
future.  
Also, variation exists within countries, which is often stronger than variation 
across different countries. Diversity in the timing and sequencing of early life-course 
events is particularly pronounced. The sequential order of events such as home leaving, 
sexual onset, marriage, and childbearing is increasingly switched and mixed up and is 
often described as “de-standardization” of the transition to adulthood. In some parts of 
society, for example, non-traditional forms of family like cohabitation, non-marriage, and 
non-marital births are widely accepted, but in other societies marriage is still preferred as 
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an ideal form. Taken all together, the “convergence toward diversity” as described by 
Billari and Wilson (2001), captures such trends and variations within and across 
countries.  
Similar to European countries, East Asian countries have experienced low fertility 
and marriage decline, however, the demographic patterns have differed widely. Having 
achieved rapid economic growth, the countries in this region are more familiar with 
accepting innovative ideas and behaviors from others. For instance, the acceptance and 
expansion of contraceptive use and small family-size norms facilitated unprecedented 
fertility decline in this region. However, most parts of this region, including Japan, 
Taiwan, South Korea, and parts of China, have reached very low fertility—lower than 
any world region since the beginning of the twenty-first century. The greatest difference 
in these trends from Western countries is the absence of cohabitation, non-marriage, and 
out-of-wedlock births. Despite gradual increases and more tolerant attitudes, these 
behaviors are not as common as in European countries and the difference is substantial. 
Low fertility and marriage delay have also gradually spread through other countries in 
East and Southeast Asia. As non-traditional behaviors have begun to increase, diversity 
across social groups has increased within countries.  
More studies need to be done to advance our understanding of the commonalities 
and differences within and across countries in terms of significance considering the high 
share of this region’s population to the world population. Research on differences within 
countries is still inadequate and existing research is often not widely read outside of the 
country, probably due to language barriers. In particular, there is lack of research that 
encompasses entire or multiple stages of demographic change. As a result, comparative 
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research is often limited to sharing key demographic measures and policy efforts across 
countries. In order to form comprehensive theories and discussion for this region, more 
diverse studies on attitudinal and behavioral changes, including diverse paths to 
adulthood, are required.  
A cohort is a useful unit of analysis to understand social changes. A cohort shares 
diverse characteristics from socialization and education to life trajectories, and successive 
cohorts are differentiated by differences in education, historical experience, and different 
responses to social changes (Ryder, 1965). Although a cohort shares the same events 
coextensively, the impact of life courses may vary with age at the time of events. For 
instance, certain historical events such as economic recession and wars, which influence 
the development of values, attitudes, and behaviors, also distinguish corresponding 
cohorts from others. Although the interaction between period and cohort effects often 
makes it difficult to understand social change, these essentially compliment to each other. 
Fertility and marriage, of course, are also influenced by such events and vary with 
birth cohorts. However, as fertility and marriage occur in a narrow range of ages, cohort 
study on timing of childbearing and marriage can be more useful for studying social 
changes with regard to fertility and marriage. Furthermore, educational attainment is 
basically considered a sort of cohort experience as people usually complete their 
education by their late teens or early 20s. As standardized schooling systems develop 
grades based on age, birth cohorts born in the same year share school curriculum, vast 
social norms, and historical backgrounds. In addition to that, period measures using 
synthetic cohorts are often distorted by rapid changes in behavioral timing (Bongaarts 
and Feeney, 1998). Thus, when considering the association between women’s education 
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and demographic behaviors such as fertility and marriage, cohort analysis is more 
appropriate than period analysis.  
This dissertation explores changes in fertility and family formation in South 
Korea (just Korea hereafter), a setting in which rapid demographic changes have taken 
place since the early twentieth century. In recent decades, fertility has further declined 
well below the replacement level, and people have increasingly delayed marriage. 
Among experts and policymakers, there is active debate and discussion with regard to the 
causes and consequences of very low fertility within the country and across East and 
Southeast Asian countries. However, regional and country-specific circumstances make it 
more complicated and policy efforts to raise fertility have not yet shown any meaningful 
results. As a result, our knowledge remains limited in terms of the significant 
demographic changes in the country. Literature tends to focus on periodic changes and 
evaluating policy effects and therefore cohort perspectives that can provide a big picture 
on the direction of change are rare in this region.  
In this dissertation, I investigate how variations in fertility and family formation 
within the country have changed over a wide range of cohorts that have seen rapid 
demographic changes. The study consists of three different but closely related papers 
about fertility differentials, postponement and recuperation of marriage, and reproductive 
concentration. In the first paper of this dissertation (Chapter 2), I examine the changing 
pattern of educational differentials in completed cohort fertility and the relative 
contribution of women’s educational attainment to that change. The second paper 
(Chapter 3) investigates how postponement and recuperation of marriage differs by level 
of education. Given that most births occur within marital unions in South Korea, 
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variation in marriage timing directly affects fertility. The third and last paper (Chapter 4) 
explores how fertility concentration has changed and explores its association with level of 
education.  
South Korea, like other East Asian countries such as Japan and Taiwan, is well 
known for rapid fertility decline accompanied by successful economic growth. During the 
last half of the twentieth century, the country has achieved a rapid fertility decline and 
marked improvements in women’s educational attainment. Total fertility rate (TFR) in 
Korea was around 6.0 in 1960 but gradually declined and reached replacement levels in 
the early 1980s. Fertility further declined and finally reached TFR of 1.3 or below, the 
lowest-low fertility, in the early 2000s. Since then, the country has maintained a very low 
fertility rate. The country is considered notable for its successful family-planning 
program, which was launched in 1962. The family-planning program accelerated the fall 
of fertility by providing free birth control and incentives for small-sized families. 
However, as the decline continued, the population control policy was officially 
withdrawn in 1996, and finally changed into pro-natalist policy in 2006 (Lee, 2009). In 
the same period, the patterns of marriage also changed from arranged marriages to 
spousal choice (love marriages) and from early marriage to late marriage. Divorce rates 
began to increase and the timing of marriage has further delayed in recent years but 
universal marriage has still stayed strong as many women do eventually marry. The rapid 
social and demographic changes in the country provide a useful venue to study how the 
transitions of childbearing and marriage have occurred across the social strata. 
This dissertation advances our understanding of the association between women’s 
education and fertility-related behaviors. In many societies, women’s education is 
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negatively associated with fertility and marriage. A few studies report that the negative 
association becomes insignificant or reversed in Scandinavian countries, where most 
advanced gender equity has been achieved. Long-term analyses of this association in 
completely different settings illuminate how it has intensely transitioned from high to low 
birth rates. These analyses also offer an opportunity to test whether the insignificant 
negative association or reversal in prior studies are due to regional specific settings, 
which might appear only in countries that have achieved a high level of gender equity. 
The association between women’s education and fertility also has important implications 
for countries seeking a decline in fertility, when they decide how to allocate efficiently 
among limited areas.   
This dissertation also improves our understanding of how different social groups 
react to demographic changes and the spread of behavior from one segment to another. 
As Coale (1973) suggested, innovative norms and behaviors expand from one group to 
another depending on “readiness,” “willingness,” and “ability.” Readiness indicates a 
cost-benefit scheme, that is, whether innovative behaviors provide some advantages; 
willingness indicates whether actors can accept behaviors after considering social 
prejudice and traditions; and ability indicates whether actors actually practice it. In the 
past, population pressure raised the demand for birth control (readiness) and national 
campaigns and family-planning programs lowered the barrier to entry (willingness). 
Distribution of free birth control methods improved access to contraceptive use (ability), 
which then resulted in a rapid diffusion of contraceptive use and a small family-size 
norm. It would be interesting to learn how other non-traditional behaviors, such as 
childlessness and non-marriage, transfer from one segment of society to another.   
 8 
 
Historical patterns of childbearing and marriage not only expand our knowledge 
of demography in this region but also add more narrative to the discussion on the second 
demographic transition. The second demographic transition already shows diversity in 
Europe. For instance, relatively high fertility and cohabitation in Scandinavian countries 
contrasts with population trends in Southern European countries like Italy and Spain. 
Diversity in Central and Eastern European countries can be regarded as another pattern 
(Sobotka, 2008). East Asian countries have several salient features, such as the absence 
of cohabitation and the attachment of childbearing to marriage, which are distinct from 
other regions. Studies on the second demographic transition in East Asia enrich our 
knowledge about the diverse pattern of this transition and advance our understanding of 
commonalities and differences with European counterparts.  
Research on long-term trends in fertility and family change inevitably requires 
longitudinal or repeated cross-sectional data that cover the corresponding scope, which 
are difficult to obtain. In 2012, Korean census samples data between 1960 and 2010 
became available and provided a way to study these long-term dynamics. Population 
censuses have been conducted in Korea almost every five years since 1925, but early 
censuses are not available except for descriptive statistics. However, the newly released 
censuses provide a rare opportunity to analyze long-term demographic trends that go 
back half a century and would go back even further if cohort analyses are used. The 
Korean census data, which are known to be of high quality, include retrospective 
information about respondents’ number of children and age at first marriage, as well as 
basic demographics such as age, sex, and highest levels of education. Taking advantage 
of this data, which is not always available in Korea or other East Asian countries, I 
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conducted a demographic analysis of long-term trends in fertility and family and how 
these trends differ by women’s levels of education.  
The first paper investigates fertility differentials by women’s level of education 
and discusses the contribution of educational expansion to a decline in fertility. Although 
educational effects on fertility vary, few studies have tested the dynamic changes of the 
association between women’s education and fertility. The frequent negative association 
between women’s education and fertility also raises the question of whether the 
expansion in women’s educational attainment is largely responsible for the rapid decline 
in fertility. Building on two competing hypotheses, the leader-follower model and the 
permanent difference model, I document how fertility differentials have developed over 
the fertility transition. Demographic decomposition techniques can be used to test the 
relative contribution of compositional change in women’s educational attainment to 
fertility decline.  
In the second paper, I explore postponement and recuperation in marriage. In 
Korea, delaying marriage has been increasing for a long time while remaining single is 
still rare, which is in stark contrast with prevailing cohabitation in European countries 
and the U.S. I essentially test whether or not delay of marriage is made up later at the 
aggregate level, and if so, how quickly. This can explain not only the discrepancy, but 
can also provide important clues about the changing direction of marriage patterns, 
whether the delay is voluntary, and how these patterns could change in the near future. 
Using data on age at the first marriage, I construct a marriage schedule and compare it 
across cohorts and determine whether it advances or lags behind a prior cohort. The 
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cohort analysis on marriage postponement and recuperation illuminates the variations of 
marriage delay within Korea and across other countries.  
The last paper explores fertility concentration, the extent to which childbearing is 
unequally distributed in a homogeneous group of women. In the context of low fertility 
such as in Korea, the rise in childlessness in a group of women can cause unequal parity 
distribution, which probably leans towards disadvantaged women given the negative 
association between education and social status. This in turn can aggregate inequality in 
childrearing, which requires substantial resources, such as time, money, and effort. The 
mixed results on the association between the concentration and level of fertility in the 
existing literature also point to the need for additional empirical studies that cover the 
long-term transition from high to low fertility. I employ three measures of fertility 
concentration and evaluate merits and demerits. Changes in fertility concentration and its 
association with women’s level of education provide new insights into how parity 
distribution has developed during the fertility transition. Taken together, these papers 
advance our understanding of how fertility and family formation have changed in the 
country, which has been on an intense demographic journey from pre-transitional fertility 
to very low fertility and toward another destination.  
   
 11 
 
CHAPTER 2 
EDUCATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS IN COHORT FERTILITY 
Introduction 
Women’s education is usually associated with lower fertility at both the 
population and the individual levels (Bongaarts, 2003; Caldwell, 1982; Castro Martín, 
1995; Cochrane, 1979; Jeffery & Basu, 1996; Jejeebhoy, 1995). However, the empirical 
association between changes in educational levels and changes in fertility rates at the 
population level is more complex. Educational change is associated with a range of 
economic and social changes which can alter the link between education and childbearing 
and/or the intensity of the link. As a result, although rising education generally leads to 
falling birth rates, the importance of educational trends varies. For instance, 
compositional change in education levels was found to account for 70% of the decline in 
fertility in Brazil between the 1935–1939 and 1951–1953 birth cohorts (Lam & Duryea, 
1999), but only about one-third of the decline in fertility between 1980 and 2000 in Iran 
(Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2008). The impact of educational change likely depends on the 
starting levels of education and fertility, as well as other contextual factors. Despite the 
theoretical importance of education as a contributing factor in the fertility transition, there 
have been relatively few longitudinal studies on education and fertility.  
In this article, I use census data from South Korea to analyze changing 
associations between education and fertility, and look at how compositional changes in 
education contributed to the decline in fertility across the transition from a high to a 
lowest-low level. South Korea (hereafter Korea) experienced one of the fastest fertility 
declines in the world. The Korean total fertility rate was 6.0 in the 1960s, but it had 
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plummeted to sub-replacement levels by 1983 (Statistics Korea, 2015). It took Korea less 
than 25 years to go from a pre-transitional stage to sub-replacement levels of fertility. In 
England, by contrast, this process took almost 130 years. Over that period, there were 
marked improvements in women’s education. The college entrance rate among female 
high school graduates was 22.2% in 1980, but had reached nearly 80% by the late 2000s 
(Statistics Korea, 2010). Among the 1960 birth cohort, the proportion of women who had 
graduated from high school was negligible; but among the 1970 birth cohort, the share 
was more than 95%. The combination of a dramatic decline in fertility and a rapid 
increase in women’s education makes the country an ideal case for studying this 
relationship during the fertility transition. Given the general association between fertility 
and education, we can hypothesize that the expansion of women’s education was a major 
factor that contributed to the rapid transition from high to low fertility rates in Korea. 
In this paper, I explore educational differentials in fertility and the changes over 
the course of the fertility transition in Korea. I briefly review theories on these 
differences by educational level and describe the Korean fertility transition. In the results 
section, I first display the trend of educational differentials in completed cohort fertility 
among women born between 1926 and 1970, and then examine the association between 
changes in fertility and in the composition of women’s educational attainment levels. I 
also analyze the education-specific pattern of falling fertility over the transition. The key 
findings and their implications are discussed in the final section. Throughout this paper, I 
utilize completed cohort fertility to measure fertility instead of the period total fertility 
rate (TFR), which is often distorted or underestimated in places like Korea, where ages at 
childbearing change rapidly (Bongaarts & Feeney, 1998). This paper contributes to the 
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literature on the association between women’s education and fertility, and has 
implications for population policies in both developing and developed countries.  
Educational differentials in fertility over the fertility transition 
Despite long interest in the association between education and fertility, few 
theories on how educational differentials change over time have not yet been established. 
Bongaarts (2003) summarized the changes in educational differentials over different 
stages of the fertility transition, and suggested two theoretical models: (1) the “leader-
follower” model and (2) the “permanent difference” model. Cleland (2002) also 
described the first as a “temporal model.” According to the leader-follower model, 
fertility declines among highly educated women, and then less educated women follow 
their example. As the fertility decline begins, the gap in fertility widens between the 
higher and lower educational groups. These educational differentials then diminish as the 
transition progresses. Due to the staggered diffusion process, fertility behaviors gradually 
become similar across educational groups. Thus, fertility differentials by level of 
education are considered transient in this model (Cleland, 2002). The underlying 
assumption is that innovations such as the norm of a small family size and the use of birth 
control emerge among an elite group and then are diffused across the social strata. 
 In contrast, the permanent-difference model posits that educational differentials 
remain significant throughout the transition. This model, which builds on the 
microeconomic perspective that fertility is influenced by socioeconomic conditions (e.g., 
Becker, 1981), sees the fertility decline as an adaptation to changes in the economic and 
the social structures (Carlsson, 1966; Davis, 1945; Notestein, 1953). In this model, falling 
fertility is largely attributable to socioeconomic changes. A rise in educational attainment 
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directly contributes to a fertility decline when the negative association between fertility 
and education remains constant. As a result, the fertility differentials by education persist 
at the end of the transition, even though the overall fertility rate decreases while the 
overall level of education increases.  
The two models described above are essentially hypothetical and represent 
extreme cases. In reality, most cases fall between these two extremes because education 
is not only a primary determinant of fertility; it also functions as a pathway for the 
transmission of social norms and behaviors. The ways in which education influences 
fertility are so numerous (see Cleland, 2002 for a comprehensive review) that structural 
effects alone cannot explain contemporary fertility decline. For the same reason, the 
indirect educational effects on fertility may be much greater than expected (Caldwell 
1980). The literature also suggests that any efforts to explain the decline in fertility over 
the course of the transition should take into account both structural and diffusion effects 
(Bras, 2014; Casterline, 2001; Cleland, 2001). Interestingly, scholars disagree about 
which model is empirically supported and how the fertility differentials end (James, 
Skirbekk, & Van Bavel, 2012; Jeffery & Basu, 1996; Lutz & Goujon, 2001). For 
instance, Cleland (2002) argued that in most societies, fertility differentials by education 
should shrink over time and converge at the end of the transition. He thus favored the 
leader-follower model (the “temporal” model in his terminology). By contrast, Bongaarts 
(2003), concluded based on his own analysis that the permanent-difference model is more 
supported because fertility differentials by education usually remain significant even in 
post-transitional countries.  
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These theoretical considerations regarding the changes in educational differentials in 
fertility have, however, rarely been tested. While the research described above examined 
several countries in late- and post-transitional phases, these studies focused primarily on 
less developed countries and relied on period measures of fertility (Bongaarts, 2003, 
2010; Cleland, 2002). The mixed conclusions of these scholars may be attributable to the 
lack of evidence of a pattern of fertility differentials over the entire course of the 
transition, especially in the post-transitional phases. The literature has suggested that 
different patterns of fertility differentials appear in different phases of the transition. For 
instance, despite the inverse relationship between fertility and education, the size of 
fertility differentials by education tends to decline in late-transitional societies. 
(Bongaarts, 2010; Castro Martín 1995; Chackiel & Schkolnik, 1996; Shapiro, 2012). 
Similarly, Skirbekk (2008) found that fertility differentials across social strata become 
smaller as fertility gets closer to replacement level, although women’s education has 
historically had a negative relationship with fertility.  
Fertility differentials by education may vary in developed countries. For instance, 
in Nordic countries the inverse association between fertility and level of education has 
substantially weakened among recent cohorts (Kravdal & Rindfuss, 2008), and is often 
reversed when the age at childbearing is controlled for (Andersson et al., 2009). The 
evidence from Nordic countries contradicts the permanent-difference hypothesis, and also 
clearly demonstrates that the existing theory is insufficient to cover all kinds of 
educational differentials in fertility. Prior research seems to have overlooked the new 
demographic changes that occur in countries in the post-transitional stages, or in the 
“Second Demographic Transition” (Lesthaeghe, 2010; Lesthaeghe & van de Kaa, 1986). 
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As period fertility rates drop below the replacement level, the fertility differences by level 
of education decrease in absolute value. Contraceptives, which are used to explain 
fertility differentials by social strata, are readily available in most developed countries. 
However, economic recession and labor market insecurity tend to prevent young women 
from having large families. As a result, the fertility differentials by level of education in 
developed countries may be marginal or smaller than previous studies have predicted.  
It is not clear whether the negative association between education and fertility 
diminishes or becomes reversed in the late and post-transitional stages, but it is apparent 
that the intensity of the association changes over the fertility transition. The dynamic 
features of this association have so far been underexplored. In this paper, I provide 
empirical evidence on the dynamic changes of fertility differentials by level of education 
using data covering the entire period of transition from well above replacement level to 
well below replacement level. I assess the contribution of changes in women’s 
educational attainment to changes in completed fertility, and demonstrate how the trend 
toward having fewer children was transmitted across levels of education.   
The fertility transition in South Korea 
As the fertility transition in Korea has been described elsewhere (e.g., Kim and 
Kim 2004), I will outline it only briefly here. The fertility decline in Korea can be divided 
into three stages: a pre-transitional stage before the 1960s, a fertility transition between 
1960 and 1985, and a post-transitional stage since 1985. Figure 2-1 depicts the total 
fertility rate in Korea between 1970 and 2010. Fertility in Korea did not decline until the 
early 1960s, and during that period the total fertility rate (TFR) remained at around 6.0 or 
above. However, the TFR increased somewhat in the late 1950s during the baby boom 
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following the Korean War (1950–1953). International aid, which included the provision 
of antibiotics during and after the war, significantly reduced mortality, especially among 
infants and children. Factors such as an increase in population density in urban areas due 
to an inflow of war refugees, extreme poverty, and uncertain political situations caused 
by the Korean War drove young urban couples to limit their family size, fueled the 
demand for contraceptives (Kwon, 2001). Meanwhile, in the two decades after free, 
compulsory primary education was introduced in 1954, illiteracy was largely eradicated. 
(Kim, 2002).   
The fertility decline started at the beginning of the 1960s. Viewing rapid 
population growth as a serious barrier to economic growth, the Korean government 
launched the National Family Planning Program in 1962 as a part of an economic 
development plan (for details, see Choe & Park, 2006; Kwon, 2001). The gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita grew rapidly from $92 in 1961 to $1,674 in 1980 (The World 
Bank, 2013). The aims of the family planning program were to reduce the desired family 
size and to promote modern contraceptive use, especially among specific groups of the 
population. The program’s early focus was on reducing fertility rates among women in 
rural areas, where fertility was the highest and access to birth control was limited. The 
program was later extended to reach the poor and the factory workers in urban areas 
(Kwon, 2001; Park et al., 1976). During this period, induced abortions were also widely 
performed, particularly among urban residents (Hong & Watson, 1972). In the 1970s, the 
government used incentives to encourage a two-child family norm, such as a tax 
deduction and benefits for public housing for couples with one or two children (Kwon, 
2001).  
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At the same time, education about population growth was incorporated into 
secondary school curricula. Another factor that contributed to the fertility decline was 
mass internal migration from rural areas to cities. This movement was associated with 
rapid urbanization and industrialization, and tended to discourage childbearing as 
migrants struggled to adapt to city life (Lee & Farber, 1984). In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
proportion of contraceptive users among married women quickly increased, from 16% in 
1965 to 44% in 1976 (Kwon, 2001: 47). The family planning program was successful, as 
slogans such as “Have fewer children and bring them up well” and “Stop at two 
regardless of sex” were well received by the general public. At the same time, access to 
secondary school education was expanding rapidly, and opportunities to pursue higher 
education were growing at a moderate pace (Kim, 2002).  
The period TFR reached the below-replacement level in 1983, and the period 
between 1980 and 1985 is often regarded as being the threshold for the post-transitional 
stage characterized by low fertility (Jun, 2005; Kim, 2005). Rapid economic growth 
continued as GDP per capita exceeded $2,000 in 1983 and reached $11,347 in 2000 (The 
World Bank, 2013). In the early 1980s, the pace of fertility decline began to slow. 
Despite having achieved a below-replacement level of fertility, the government 
maintained the family planning program; encouraging families to have fewer children 
and seeking to mitigate son preference, partly out of fear that there would be an absolute 
increase in the population as the large young cohorts entered their primary childbearing 
ages (Lee, 2009). Thus, government policies continued to promote sterilization and 
provide incentives for restricting family size until the late 1980s. The sustained decline in 
period fertility rates finally caused the government to abandon the program in the late 
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1980s, leaving contraceptive distribution to the private and commercial sectors. 
Meanwhile, unbalanced sex ratios at birth and selective abortions emerged in the 1990s 
after new techniques for detecting the sex of the fetus were introduced (Larsen, Chung, & 
Das Gupta 1998). In 1996, the government officially adopted a new population policy 
with an emphasis on reproductive health care services.  
In 2001, the Korean period TFR reached 1.3, the lowest-low level of fertility as 
defined by Kohler and colleagues (2002). Since the early 1980s, access to higher 
education had expanded rapidly for both men and women, and women’s levels of 
participation in social activities and labor have increased. More crucially, the Asian 
economic crisis in 1997 changed the paradigm on marriage and childbearing and augured 
a further decline in fertility (Kim, 2007). The combination of changes in the status of 
women, growing economic insecurity, and insufficient childcare options led Koreans to 
delay marriage and childbearing (Jun, 2005; Kim, 2005; Suzuki, 2005). In 2003 the 
Korean government finally phased out the family planning program, which was by then 
more than 40 years old. A few years later, they adopted a set of pro-natalistic policies 
aimed at helping the country prepare for a period of aging. These policies are described in 
the First Basic Planning for Low Fertility and Aged Society 2006–2010, published in 
2006 (Lee, 2009). Despite this shift, Korean fertility is still under the lowest-low level, 
with a TFR of 1.19 in 2013 (Statistics Korea, 2014).   
Data and Methods 
Data and measures. This study relies on a series of sample data from the Korean 
Population and Household Census (hereafter, Korean census) between 1970 and 2010. 
The Korean census is conducted every five years by Statistics Korea. The census usually 
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contains a short survey questionnaire on households and individuals, and in most cases 
includes a question on the number of children ever born. For my analysis, I decided to 
use questionnaires from seven of the nine censuses conducted between 1970 and 2010 
(the census data for 1980 and 1995 do not contain pertinent information). Thus, the 
sample data were drawn from the censuses of 1970, 1975, 1985, 1990, 2000, 2005, and 
2010. 
I compute completed cohort fertility by averaging the children ever born to 
women aged 40–44. As in prior research (e.g., Frejka, Jones, & Sardon, 2010), I consider 
ages 40–44 as the end of women’s reproductive period. This age range was chosen for 
three main reasons: first, it reflects the census interval of five years; second, using ages 
40–44 allowed me to include more recent birth cohorts in the analysis; and third, because 
the proportion of births to women age 45 and older is very small, the level of completed 
fertility does not change significantly when women are measured at ages 45–49 or 50–
54.1 For the 1980 and 1995 censuses, in which the question of children ever born was 
omitted, the corresponding birth cohorts were selected at ages 45–49 from the censuses of 
1985 and 2000, respectively. All of the information, including the number of children and 
educational attainment, is measured at ages 40–44 unless otherwise specified.  The 
questionnaire regarding the number of children ever born is retrospective, which means 
that the information provided may be inaccurate due to memory lapses or a failure to 
                                                 
1 Based on the data analyzed in this paper, for example, the computed completed fertility (CF) for the 1960 
birth cohort is 1.89, which is not far from the CF of 1.98 found when ages 50–54 are used for the end of 
women’s reproductive years. 
 21 
 
report children who died (Murphy, 2009; Ní Bhrolcháin, Beaujouan, & Murphy, 2011). 
In light of these concerns about the under-enumeration of children and selection caused 
by mortality differentials, responses from women over age 50 were excluded from the 
analysis. The sample size for each birth cohort ranges from a minimum of 1,389 to a 
maximum of 4,289.   
The educational attainment of the respondents was measured using six categories: 
incomplete primary education, completed primary education, completed lower-secondary 
education, completed upper-secondary education, some college, and a bachelor’s degree 
or higher. These categories are designed to capture the rapid educational transition in 
Korea, including the dramatic improvements in female education.  
Like other social surveys in Korea, the census questionnaire asks only ever-
married women about their pregnancy and birth histories. As a result, information on 
children born to women who have never been married is not available. I assumed that all 
of the women who had never been married by age 40–44 were childless because 
nonmarital births are rare in Korea, and marriage is still nearly universal for women by 
the time they reach the end of their reproductive period (Jones & Gubhaju, 2009). Even 
though the proportion of nonmarital births to all births was less than 1% in the 1960s and 
slightly increased to 2.1% by 2012, nomarital births are still uncommon (Statistical 
Korea, 2015). In addition, the data analyzed here suggest that approximately 98% of 
women born between 1926 and 1970 were married by the ages of 40 to 44. There are also 
187 cases with missing values for the number of children among ever-married women 
aged 40–44. Because marriage and childbearing are virtually universal in Korea, 
childlessness may be considered shameful, and a non-response may be a way of avoiding 
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a report of childlessness.2 Based on the assumption that the majority of the missing cases 
represent a non-response or avoidance by childless women at the end of their 
reproductive years, I classified those women as childless, and included them in my 
analysis in order to offset a possible underestimation of childless women. The number of 
these women is negligible, and their inclusion has a minimal effect on the results. Cases 
in which the educational attainment or the marital status were missing are simply omitted 
here because they made up less than 0.1% of the total sample size, and no regular pattern 
was found. 
Methods and strategy. The analysis presented here is composed of three parts. 
First, I review educational differentials in completed fertility over 45 single-year birth 
cohorts. As my interest is in fertility differences across educational groups, completed 
cohort fertility can be expressed as a function of education-specific completed fertility 
and the composition of educational attainment. Because we consider only women at the 
end of their reproductive periods, age is not required in this formula. Education-specific 
completed fertility rates are measured for every five-year birth cohort for women born 
between 1926 and 1970. The trends in education-specific completed fertility rates can be 
used to help us determine whether the pattern is closer to the leader-follower model or to 
the permanent difference model.  
                                                 
2 To confirm, I checked household information for the missing cases. Of those cases, around 76% had no 
children living in the household. Approximately three-quarters of the cases with missing data in the CEB 
may be attributable to ever-married women with no children. 
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Second, I utilize a demographic-decomposition technique. This technique can be 
used to compare demographic measures between two populations or the same population 
between two different times, and to separate the effect of changing a single factor from 
other effects (Das Gupta, 1993; Romo, 2003). In this paper, I isolate the effects of 
fertility rates (rate effects) from those of educational composition (composition effects). 
After specifying that completed cohort fertility for a birth cohort equals the sum—as i 
goes to j (the number of educational groups)—of the education-specific fertility rate 
multiplied by the proportion of the corresponding educational group, the difference in 
completed fertility between the two birth cohorts is decomposed into change in the rates 
of completed fertility and change in the composition of educational attainment as 
follows:   
 𝐶𝐹𝑎 =  ∑ (𝑟𝑖
𝑎 ∙ 𝑝𝑖
𝑎)𝑗𝑖   (1) 
 ∆𝐶𝐹 = 𝐶𝐹𝑎 − 𝐶𝐹𝑏 =  ∑ (𝑟𝑖
𝑎 ∙ 𝑝𝑖
𝑎)𝑗𝑖 −  ∑ (𝑟𝑖
𝑏 ∙ 𝑝𝑖
𝑏)𝑗𝑖 . (2) 
In this equation, 𝐶𝐹𝑎 represents the completed cohort fertility for the birth cohort 
𝑎, Δ𝐶𝐹 is the change in completed cohort fertility between birth cohort a and b, 𝑖 is the 
educational-level index, 𝑗 is the number of educational levels, 𝑟𝑖𝑎 is the completed 
fertility rate of group 𝑖 for the birth cohort a, and 𝑝𝑖
𝑎 is the proportion of group 𝑖 for the 
birth cohort 𝑎. 
If we have two populations, we can evaluate the effect of a single factor on a 
standard population, which is acquired by averaging the other factor across both 
populations. However, the standardizing process is much more complicated when we 
have multiple populations. Das Gupta (1993) suggested a useful way to standardize 
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demographic measures for multiple populations. His technique has frequently been used 
in prior research, particularly when demographic trends have been analyzed (DeLeone, 
Lichter, & Strawderman, 2009; Hayford 2005; Smith, Morgan, & Koropeckyj-Cox, 
1996). Having nine different birth cohorts, I employ Das Gupta’s method to standardize 
completed fertility for multiple populations, and then break it down into six educational 
categories.3  
 Finally, I use parity progression ratios to show the pattern of declining fertility 
across levels of education. A parity progression ratio is a demographic measure used to 
capture the proportion of women who have another child (parity k + 1) from a certain 
number of children (parity k) (Preston, Heuveline, & Guillot, 2001: 101–106). Parity 
progression ratios are simply parity-specific birth probabilities. Period parity progression 
ratios have often been used in prior research on fertility change (e.g., Feeney, 1991). 
However, I use cohort parity progression ratios instead of period ratios, and further 
expand my calculation by the level of educational attainment in order to compare the 
trend of falling fertility across social strata: 
 𝑃𝑃𝑅(𝑘,𝑘+1) =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘+1 𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑘 𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒
. (3) 
 I compute cohort parity progression ratios for six educational groups and compare 
the patterns. After parity progression ratios are used to reveal the detailed pattern of 
fertility decline by birth parity, we are better able to compare changes in fertility 
                                                 
3 The process of decomposing differences for polytomous-categorical variables is explained in Chevan and 
Sutherland (2009).   
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outcomes across educational groups, and thus to discern the evolutionary pattern of 
educational differentials in fertility. Because of the small sample size for each 
educational group, especially among the oldest and youngest birth cohorts, I use a five-
year birth cohort instead of a single-year cohort for the decomposition and the parity 
progression ratios.    
Results 
Completed fertility and educational differentials. Figure 2-2 shows trends in 
educational attainment among women aged 40–44 for the corresponding 1926–1970 birth 
cohorts. The figure illustrates the marked expansion in women’s educational attainment 
between the 1926 and 1970 birth cohorts. For example, less than 5% of women born in 
1926 had more than an upper-secondary education, compared with nearly 95% of women 
born in 1970. Similarly, the share of women who achieved some type of higher education 
increased from less than 1% to 37% between two birth cohorts.  
 Figure 2-3 illustrates the completed cohort fertility and educational differentials 
for women born between 1926 and 1970. There is a clear downward trend without 
temporal fluctuations in completed fertility among all of the cohorts. The average number 
of children per woman decreased by more than one-third over the 45 birth cohorts, from 
5.51 for the 1926 cohort to 1.73 for the 1970 cohort. The below-replacement level was 
reached when the 1957 birth cohort had 1.98 births per woman. The pace of the decline in 
completed fertility moderated after this point, but continued through to the most recent 
cohort. As was mentioned previously, the period TFR of Korea fell to replacement level 
between 1980 and 1985 (Jun, 2005; Kim, 2005). For the 1957 cohort of women, who 
would have started having children soon after marrying, the median age at first marriage 
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was 23 (Appendix 2-A). If we assume that the primary childbearing ages of the 1957 
were 23–27, we can see that there was a shift in both the cohort and the period fertility 
measures at this time, which was the point in the fertility transition at which Korea started 
moving toward low fertility. The uninterrupted downward trend in completed fertility 
contrasts with the falling trend with fluctuations in period TFR shown in Figure 2-1. The 
trends look different because of the distinctive attributes of period TFR, which is overly 
sensitive to changes in the timing of fertility. For instance, the median age at first 
marriage was 18 among women born in 1926, but it increased to 25 among women born 
in 1970, and to 29 among women born in 1980 (Appendix 2-A). In the Korean context, in 
which marriage is universal, these shifts in the timing of marriage are closely connected 
to shifts in the timing of fertility. This pattern produces a tempo effect that results in an 
underestimation of period fertility rates (Bongaarts & Feeney, 1998).   
Figure 2-3 also displays the educational differentials in completed fertility and 
how they change over time. In the figure, the education-specific completed fertility shows 
that, by and large, women’s educational attainment is negatively associated with 
completed fertility: the higher a woman’s educational level, the fewer children she has. 
The fluctuations among women with both some college and more than a bachelor’s 
degree among the oldest cohorts, and among women with an incomplete primary 
education among the youngest cohorts, are largely due to the small sample sizes. 
Overall, the completed cohort fertilities for all of the educational groups declined 
across the 1926 and 1970 cohorts in Korea. Despite some variation in the slope across the 
levels of education, it is evident that a sharp fall in fertility took place among women at 
all educational levels. The group with the lowest level of education—i.e., an incomplete 
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primary education—experienced the largest decline in fertility, from 5.89 for the 1926 
cohort to 1.50 for the 1970 cohort. 
Meanwhile, the educational differentials in completed fertility almost disappeared 
among recent birth cohorts with sub-replacement fertility. When we use five-year birth 
cohorts to mitigate temporal fluctuations between cohorts, we find that the difference 
between the highest and lowest fertility groups was 2.44 (42% relative difference) among 
the 1926–1930 cohort, but that this gap shrank to 0.29 (14% relative difference) among 
the latest 1966–1970 cohort. The lines for education-specific fertility rates have 
converged below the replacement level at between 1.7 and 2.0. These findings are 
surprising given that previous studies have argued that educational differentials in 
fertility remain significant even in post-transitional societies (Bongaarts, 2003). Despite 
the unprecedented expansion in women’s education in Korea, fertility differentials by 
level of education have faded considerably across the 45 single-year cohorts studied. 
The analysis shows that, among the youngest birth cohorts, the two extreme ends 
of the educational spectrum—i.e., the highest and the lowest educational groups—had the 
lowest fertility levels. Interestingly, the least-educated women born in 1926, or those with 
incomplete primary education, had on average the highest number of children; while the 
least-educated women born in 1970 had the second-lowest number of children. 
Meanwhile, women with a bachelor’s degree or higher had some of the lowest fertility 
rates across the cohorts. The lower fertility of both groups among the recent birth cohorts 
is attributable in part to a recent rise in never-married women in those groups. When the 
1966–1970 cohorts reached ages 40–44 in 2010 (Statistics Korea, 2015), the proportions 
of women who had never married was 25.3% among those with an incomplete primary 
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education and 9.3% among those with a bachelor’s degree or higher. These shares were 
higher than the proportion of the entire 1966–1970 cohort who had never married (6.2%), 
and were far higher than that of the 1926–1930 cohort (0.4% in 1970). A possible 
explanation for these trends is that when primary school completion is mandatory, 
women with an incomplete primary education are more likely to be socially 
disadvantaged or physically/mentally disabled, and would therefore have difficulties 
finding an appropriate partner. Meanwhile, as the age at first marriage rose steadily, the 
share of women who remained single through the end of the reproductive span gradually 
increased, especially among those with the most education. 
Was the fertility decline in Korea driven by educational expansion? Table 2-1 
shows the change in completed cohort fertility and its decomposition results for five-year 
birth cohorts. The bottom section of the table provides a comparison between the oldest 
and youngest birth cohorts. Due to small sample sizes, five-year birth cohorts are used 
instead of single-year birth cohorts. 
While completed fertility declined continuously from the 1926–1930 cohorts to 
the 1966–1970 cohorts, both the rate effects and the composition effects changed in 
different directions. Rate effects accounted for about four-fifths of the observed changes 
in fertility between the cohorts until the 1956–1960 birth cohort. The rate effects over the 
fertility change declined for the 1961–1965 cohort, and finally began operating in the 
opposite direction for the most recent cohorts (-31% for the 1966–1970 birth cohort). In 
contrast, composition effects accounted for about one-fifth of the decline in fertility for 
most of the birth cohorts, but the contribution of the composition effects to fertility 
decline soared among the most recent birth cohorts with sub-replacement fertility. 
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Although the observed change in fertility is small, the compositional change among the 
1966–1970 cohort covers more than just the fertility difference from the previous cohort. 
Section B at the bottom of Table 2-1 summarizes the results of the decomposition 
of the change in completed fertility between the 1926–1930 cohort and the 1966–1970 
cohort, and their extension for the six educational categories based on composition-
standardized completed fertility. The results reveal that four-fifths (79%) of the change in 
completed fertility (-3.52 per woman) between the 1926–1930 and 1966–1970 cohorts 
was attributable to changes in fertility behaviors (rate effects), and that the expansion of 
women’s education accounted for one-fifth (21%) of the change. Dividing the 
decomposition into educational categories demonstrates how each group contributed to 
the change in fertility in terms of rate and composition effects. When it comes to rate 
effects, the contributions of the lower educational groups were especially pronounced. 
For instance, the changes in the fertility rates of women with incomplete or completed 
primary education accounted for 23% or 24%, respectively, of the fertility change that 
occurred between the 1926–1930 and 1966–1970 cohorts. The group of women with 
upper-secondary education accounted for 16% of the fertility changes between these 
cohorts. However, the contribution to falling fertility of the rate effects of women with 
higher education remained marginal: 2% for women with some college and 4% for 
women with a bachelor’s degree or higher.  
The composition effects by level of education were more dynamic. The 
composition effect of incomplete primary education alone explained 56% of the overall 
change in fertility; this effect is the largest of all of the rate and composition effects by 
level of education. Similarly, the compositional change in completed primary education 
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was responsible for 33% of the entire change in fertility. The bulk of the composition 
effects among the lower educational groups may be attributed to free, compulsory 
primary education. These large composition effects were, however, offset to a 
considerable extent by those of more educated groups which operated in the opposite 
direction (40% for upper-secondary education, 10% for some college, and 15% for a 
bachelor’s degree or higher). Such composition effects indicate that the rapid 
improvements in women’s educational attainment levels achieved in Korea did not 
necessarily involve a corresponding drop in fertility when rate effects were controlled for. 
Specifically, the composition effects caused by a decrease in the proportion of the less-
educated group were canceled out by the opposite effects caused by a subsequent rise in 
the shares of groups with the next-highest educational levels (not shown here). Despite 
the impressive gains made in women’s educational attainment, composition effects were 
found to account for just one-fifth of the entire fertility change during the analyzed 
interval. 
When rate effects and composition effects were considered together, it became 
clear that the two groups with the lowest educational levels—i.e., incomplete and 
completed primary education—were mainly responsible for the fertility change. The sum 
of the rate and composition effects for the two groups was large enough to cover the 
entire fertility decline. The substantial declines in fertility among the two groups also 
contributed to the narrowing of the fertility gaps across levels of education among the 
younger cohorts.   
Meanwhile, completed fertility fell below the replacement level among the 1956–
1960 cohort. Thereafter, the distribution of both the rate and the composition effects 
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changed, and became different from that of prior birth cohorts. The cohorts of women 
born after 1960 were the first generation who benefited from the expansion of higher 
education in the early 1980s. The shift in the pattern of rate and composition effects after 
the 1961–1965 cohort suggests that Korea had entered the Second Demographic 
Transition. 
The average number of children per woman declined by as much as 3.52 between 
the 1926–1930 cohort and the 1966–1970 cohort, and the majority of that change was 
attributable to changes in fertility behaviors. Despite the marked transition in women’s 
educational attainment in South Korea, and contrary to expectations, we found that 
educational expansion accounted for only one-fifth of the fertility decline between the 
1926–1930 cohort and the 1966–1970 cohort, or a drop in completed fertility of 0.74 
children per woman. The considerable composition effects of the lower educational 
groups on falling fertility were offset by the opposite effects due to subsequent growth in 
the higher educational groups. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the expansion of 
women’s educational attainment was the main driver of the fertility decline during the 
Korean fertility transition. 
Can a leader-follower model explain the fertility decline in South Korea? As 
can be seen in Figure 2-3, fertility rates by level of education are converging. The 
literature has suggested that this kind of convergence generally occurs when falling 
fertility spreads successively from leader to follower (Bongaarts, 2003; Cleland, 2002). 
Figure 2-3 does not provide clear evidence of whether the pattern is close to the leader-
follower model. To explore this pattern in more depth, I present cohort parity progression 
ratios in Figure 2-4. Some of the progression lines were omitted due to the small sample 
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size. In the figure, parity progression rates to parity three (PPR2) and parity four (PPR3) 
fell considerably for all of the educational levels for the analyzed birth cohorts, while 
progression rates to parity one (PPR0) and to parity two (PPR1) changed little. These 
changes suggest that the fertility decline in Korea was mainly attributable to the transition 
from having four or more children to having two children.  
 The salient feature of the figure is that education-specific patterns of parity 
progression represent the stages in the progression of the fertility transition. For example, 
the shapes of the parity progression ratios for the middle levels of education—i.e., lower- 
and upper-secondary education—are similar to those of the entire Korean population in 
the transition from high to low parities: the progression rates to third and fourth births 
declined considerably, while the progression rates to first and second births remained 
stable (Choe & Retherford, 2009). Interestingly, the pattern of parity progression ratios 
for incomplete primary education is also analogous to the beginning stage of the 
transition, when the shift from high to low parities began. In contrast, the patterns for a 
bachelor’s degree or a higher education seem to indicate the start of a post-transitional 
stage or of a new set of demographic patterns (the Second Demographic Transition); the 
progressions to third and fourth births stabilized at low levels, and the progression to a 
second birth began to decline in recent cohorts. Overall, the figure indicates that the 
pattern of falling parity progression ratios first began among the most educated group 
(bachelor’s degree or higher) and soon started to take hold among the group with the 
next-highest level of education. This sequential decline in parity progression, which is 
consistent with prior research (Cleland, 2002), provides evidence that lower fertility 
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spread from highly educated women (forerunners) to less educated women (followers) 
during the fertility transition in Korea.   
The decline in progression ratios to third-parity births (PPR2) across levels of 
women’s education is more distinctive. Falling progression ratios of third births occurred 
almost at the same time, but shifted from the more-educated to the less-educated groups. 
Table 2-2 shows which birth cohorts first experienced significant declines in the 
progression ratio to third births by women’s educational levels. Here, I chose the parity 
progression ratio of 0.7 for the onset of parity-specific fertility decline, and 0.4 for the 
loss of parity-specific predominance. Although the choice of thresholds was arbitrary to 
some degree, it provided a useful way to look at the changes in the fertility pattern. As we 
can see in Table 2-2, the level of education was associated with the order of the birth 
cohort who first experienced “significant” declines in the progression: the higher 
educational group experienced an earlier drop in the parity progression ratio to third 
births. 
Although some of the groups appear to overlap when we attempt to determine 
which of the birth cohorts first experienced such changes, the table shows that the pattern 
of falling fertility progressed through educational pathways. The progression ratios to the 
third birth declined with each level of education. For the two most-educated groups—i.e., 
some college and a bachelor’s degree and higher—the progression to a third birth began 
to fall below 0.7 in the 1936–1940 birth cohort and reached 0.4 in the 1946–1950 birth 
cohort. A similar trajectory could be observed among the groups that followed: from 
upper secondary, to lower secondary, to completed primary, to incomplete primary 
education. The spread of the decrease in the progression ratio to below 0.4 was even 
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faster than to below 0.7, and the time lag between the educational groups declined from a 
15-year to a 10-year cohort interval. 
However, none of the groups who experienced a parity progression ratio to 
second birth (PPR1) fell below 0.7, except for the group with incomplete primary 
education. Despite substantial changes in fertility patterns, the progression to a first and a 
second birth have been consistently maintained by the majority of women, which implies 
that a two-child family norm has been well established in Korea. For those with 
incomplete primary education, the parity progression ratio to parity two reached 0.7 
among the 1961–1965 cohort, but its impact on the overall trend can be ignored because 
the corresponding cohorts came from generations in which free, compulsory primary 
education had been instituted (less than 1% of the cohorts).   
The results of the cohort parity progression analysis offer evidence that the pattern 
of the Korean fertility transition most closely conforms to the leader-follower model. 
Although fertility fell in all of the educational groups with a small variation in birth 
cohorts, the decline definitely spread from the most- to the least-educated groups. In 
addition, despite the sustained low fertility in Korea, the two-child family norm seems to 
be firmly established in all of the educational groups, and the tendency to have a third 
child has declined considerably during the transition. This striking transformation in 
parity progression patterns was completed in just 40 years of birth cohorts. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
South Korea experienced one of the most rapid declines in fertility of any country 
in the late 20th century. The aim of this paper was to identify how educational 
differentials in fertility changed over the Korean fertility transition, and to understand the 
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contribution of changes in educational attainment to the fertility decline among women 
born between 1926 and 1970. 
Completed fertility declined from 5.51 for women born in 1926 to 1.73 for 
women born in 1970. Educational differentials in completed fertility have gradually 
decreased. Although marginal differences still remain, the once-obvious gaps in lifetime 
fertility by level of education disappeared among the birth cohorts of women who just 
ended their reproductive periods. In the recent cohorts, women at both extremes of the 
educational spectrum had the lowest levels of completed fertility. This finding blurs the 
negative association between fertility and women’s education that was clearly observed 
in the early stages of the transition. Overall, educational differentials in completed 
fertility faded away as the transition reached its end. This convergence of educational 
differentials in fertility is surprising because it contradicts previous research showing that 
the fertility gaps between educational groups are substantial in most societies, even those 
in the end- or post-transitional stage (Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2008; Alves & Cavenaghi, 
2009; Bongaarts, 2003, 2010).  
The extraordinary decline in fertility in Korea was mainly attributable to 
decreasing fertility in every social group for the cohorts who were having children prior 
to the point when the replacement level was reached. Women’s educational attainment 
did not start to play a large role in fertility changes until after this point. While the rapid 
increase in women’s educational attainment was virtually unprecedented, it still only 
accounted for one-fifth of the fertility decline during the transition in Korea. The pattern 
of fertility differentials by level of education in Korea appears to have conformed with 
the leader-follower model rather than with the permanent-difference model (Bongaarts, 
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2003; Cleland, 2002). Having experienced more rapid fertility decline, the Korean pattern 
could be identified through cohort parity progression ratios by level of education. The 
trends in parity progression ratios demonstrate that the decline in fertility spread from the 
most-educated to the least-educated groups during the fertility transition, and that the 
norm of a two-child family became established across all social strata in Korea. Such a 
rapid transformation of fertility patterns cannot occur without the extensive diffusion and 
social interactions of small family norms and contraceptive use, as prior research has 
discussed (Chung & Das Gupta, 2007; Kye, 2012; Montgomery & Chung, 1999).  
Differences in rates of diffusion and social interactions may lead to further 
variation in the dynamic pattern of educational differentials in fertility across countries 
(Bongaarts, 2003). For instance, family planning programs can reduce the fertility gap 
across social strata by helping to meet the contraceptive needs of disadvantaged women 
(Amaral & Potter, 2009). In Korea, the family planning program was initially targeted at 
women in rural areas with high fertility rates and limited access to birth control (Kwon, 
2001). As the result of active fieldwork and campaigns, contraceptive use and the small 
family norm spread from one group to another (Montgomery & Chung, 1999; Park et al., 
1976). In countries in the late-transitional stages, in which most of the differences in 
fertility rates come from differences in rates of unwanted pregnancies (Bongaarts, 2003, 
2010), family planning programs may be more useful than is generally expected in 
narrowing the fertility gap across social strata. Without such efforts, fertility differentials 
by social strata may remain significant even after countries lower their overall fertility to 
replacement levels, as in the case in Brazil (Alves & Cavenaghi, 2009; Lam & Duryea, 
1999).  
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For the same reason, the degree of homogeneity in a society could influence the 
extent of fertility differentials. Innovative ideas and behaviors may spread more quickly 
in a homogenous society than in a heterogeneous society once the adoption of the 
innovation reaches a certain threshold. Located on a small peninsula in which the land 
route north has long been closed by the political conflict with North Korea, South Korea 
is an ethnically homogenous society with a single language. Having a relatively 
homogenous culture and geographic constraints likely facilitates social interaction and 
the diffusion of innovative ideas and behaviors in Korea. Thus, the Korean pattern of 
educational differentials in fertility may differ from the patterns found in other countries.  
Internal migration might have contributed to the converging patterns of fertility 
differentials. Industrialization and urbanization triggered large-scale internal migrations 
from rural to urban areas between the 1960s and 1980s in Korea. Internal migrants from 
rural areas contributed to the decline in fertility through their acceptance of contraceptive 
use and the small family norm (Lee & Farber, 1984; Lee & Pol, 1993). However, because 
most of the people affected by this trend were from birth cohorts involved in the early 
phases of the transition, internal migration probably did not play an important role in the 
overall pattern of fertility differentials. 
When interpreting the results of this study, several points should be noted. First, 
these findings should be differentiated from research based on period fertility. Cohort 
fertility measured at the end of the reproductive span is usually less responsive than 
period fertility in reflecting the dynamic changes in fertility at younger ages. Although 
completed cohort fertility may mask qualitative aspects of fertility behaviors, such as 
birth timing and birth spacing, it is relatively stable and precise. By contrast, period 
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measures of fertility may present a distorted picture, especially when the timing of 
childbearing changes as rapidly as it did in Korea (Bongaarts & Feeney, 1998). 
Second, the findings do not indicate that improvements in women’s educational 
attainment are not a necessary prerequisite for fertility decline. My analysis showed that a 
considerable portion of the fertility decline was attributable to compositional changes in 
the lower educational groups, caused by the introduction of universal primary education. 
In addition, education helped to spread new ideas and values. This paper supports the 
hypothesis that mass education provides a solid foundation for fertility decline in both 
direct and indirect ways, and that the indirect effects of education on fertility are greater 
than the direct effects (Axinn & Barber, 2001; Caldwell, 1980). 
This study also has a few limitations. First, I could not use detailed information on 
fertility other than number of children ever born. Educational differentials in completed 
fertility can be further decomposed into differences in wanted and unwanted fertility, and 
their contributions to fertility differentials also vary with the stages of the transition 
(Bongaarts, 2003; Musick et al., 2009). Once better data become available, decomposing 
the fertility difference and how it changes over time would be an interesting topic. 
Second, the completed fertility rates used here may have been marginally underestimated 
due to data limitations, although this did not appear to make a meaningful difference in 
the results. With the data for Korea that are currently available, it is difficult to estimate 
the exact levels of fertility for women with non-traditional childbearing histories, such as 
those who had out-of-wedlock births or are childless. Finally, as the information on 
children ever born comes from retrospective questions, the number may be 
underestimated due to incorrect recall or the omission of children who died.  
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Despite these shortcomings, this paper provides a rare look at how educational 
differentials in fertility change in a country that has experienced a rapid decline in 
fertility as part of a fertility transition. In Korea, the sustained low fertility has brought on 
social concerns in recent years. However, looking at cohort fertility rather than period 
fertility, raises the question of whether or not the Korean fertility has reached the lowest-
low level. Researchers and policy makers should pay more attention to the timing of 
fertility which determines period fertility, especially in countries where age at 
childbearing changes rapidly as in Korea (Bongaarts & Feeney, 1998). The effects of 
education on fertility decline are diverse and vary according to the conditions of each 
country. The Korean pattern of educational differentials in fertility illustrates the need for 
a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between education and fertility 
transition.   
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Table 2-1  
Standardization and Decomposition of the Change in Completed Cohort Fertility.  
 A. Standardization and decomposition of change in completed fertility   
Birth cohort  
CF 
CF standardized except Change in CF Change attributable to 
Fertility  
rates 
Educational 
 composition 
Rate effects Composition effects 
C1926–1930 5.36 4.83 3.49       
C1931–1935 4.78 4.34 3.41 -0.58 (100%) -0.49 (85%) -0.09 (15%) 
C1936–1940 4.07 3.79 3.25 -0.71 (100%) -0.55 (78%) -0.16 (22%) 
C1941–1945 3.41 3.26 3.11 -0.66 (100%) -0.52 (79%) -0.14 (21%) 
C1946–1950 2.79 2.79 2.97 -0.62 (100%) -0.48 (77%) -0.14 (23%) 
C1951–1955 2.29 2.35 2.91 -0.50 (100%) -0.44 (88%) -0.06 (12%) 
C1956–1960 1.96 2.08 2.85 -0.33 (100%) -0.27 (81%) -0.06 (19%) 
C1961–1965 1.88 2.04 2.80 -0.09 (100%) -0.04 (42%) -0.05 (58%) 
C1966–1970 1.84 2.05 2.75 -0.04 (100%) 0.01 (-31%) -0.05 (131%) 
 
B. Decomposition of change in CF between the oldest (c1926–1930) and youngest (c1966–1970) cohorts 
Birth cohort (by level of education) Observed 
change in CF 
Change in CF*  Change attributable to 
Rate effects Composition effects 
C1926–1930  /  c1966–1970 -3.52 -3.52 (100%) -2.78 (79%) -0.74 (21%) 
Incomplete primary   -2.80 (80%) -0.82 (23%) -1.98 (56%) 
Completed primary   -2.03 (57%) -0.86 (24%) -1.17 (33%) 
Lower secondary  -0.18 (5%) -0.33 (9%) 0.15 (-4%) 
Upper secondary  0.84 (-24%) -0.55 (16%) 1.39 (-40%) 
Some college  0.27 (-8%) -0.08 (2%) 0.34 (-10%) 
Bachelor’s degree or higher or more  0.38 (-11%) -0.15 (4%) 0.53 (-15%) 
Note: * For the six educational categories, standardized CFs for component were used.  
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Table 2-2 
The First Birth Cohort Reached below 0.7 or 0.4 of Parity Progression Ratios by Level of 
Women’s Educational Attainment. 
 Parity progression ratio to third births (PPR2) 
Level of education  below 0.7 below 0.4 
Incomplete primary  c1951–1955 c1956–1960 
Completed primary  c1951–1955 c1956–1960 
Lower secondary c1946–1950 c1951–1955 
Upper secondary c1941–1945 c1951–1955 
Some college c1936–1940 c1946–1950 
Bachelor’s degree or higher c1936–1940 c1946–1950 
Note: Author’s calculations from Korean census sample data between 1970 and 2010.   
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Figure 2-1. Total Fertility Rates and the Number of Births in South Korea, 1970–2010. 
 
Source: Statistics Korea (2015). 
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Figure 2-2. Compositional Change in the Educational Attainment of Women Aged 40–44 
for the 1926–1970 Birth Cohorts, South Korea. 
 
Note: Author’s own calculations from Korean census sample data between 1970 and 
2010. 
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Figure 2-3. Educational Differentials in Completed Cohort Fertility for Women Born 
between 1926 and 1970, South Korea. 
 
Note: Author’s calculations from Korean census sample data between 1970 and 2010.  
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Figure 2-4. Cohort Parity-Progression Ratios by the Level of Women’s Educational 
Attainment between the 1926–1930 Cohort and the 1966–1970 Cohort, South Korea. 
 
Note: In cases in which an educational group represents less than 1% of the samples for 
the corresponding cohort, the parity progression ratios for the group were omitted in the 
figure above. Author’s calculations from Korean census sample data between 1970 and 
2010. 
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CHAPTER 3  
MARRIAGE POSTPONEMENT AND RECUPERATION 
Introduction 
Over the past decades, delaying marriage has become increasingly common in 
most developed countries. In European countries and the U.S., young people are 
increasingly postponing marriage and many are electing other forms of families such as 
cohabitation and single-parent families (Billari & Liefbroer, 2010; Lesthaeghe & Moors, 
2000; Sobotka & Toulemon, 2008). Marriage has become less desirable for younger 
generations and it is no longer necessary for childbearing. Despite considerable variation 
between and within countries, overall, the centrality of family moved away from 
marriage, and childbearing has been decoupled from marriage in European countries and 
the U.S.  
Marriage delay is closely related to sustained low fertility in East Asia, but little is 
known about how it developed and proceeded. Women’s mean age at first marriage has 
continuously increased in East Asian countries since the early twentieth century (Jones, 
2007; Jones & Bubhaju, 2009). The rise in women’s age at first marriage, which 
contributed to fertility decline in the second half of last century, is attributable in part to 
extended education, an increase in social and economic activities, and growing economic 
uncertainty.  However, the biggest difference from Western countries is the strong bond 
between marriage and childbearing in East Asia. Most childbearing still occurs within 
marital unions and non-marital births remain marginal in this region. Cohabitation has 
grown at a very slow pace and is not yet common. The growing number of women with 
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tertiary education accounts for marriage delay to some extent, but it is not the primary 
factor in Japan and South Korea (Jones & Gubhaju, 2009).  
Marriage is still an important proximate determinant for fertility and an essential 
aspect in understanding family dynamics, especially in East Asia. Research on marriage 
delay is usually concerned with changes in the prevalence and timing of first marriages, 
such as the proportion of ever-married women and the mean (or median) age at first 
marriage. Differences in prevalence and timing are often used for understanding 
educational differences in marriage as well. However, marriage occurs at all ages and its 
progression with regard to age may differ by level of education. The simple cross-cut of 
marriage rates or the mean age at marriage across levels of education might reflect 
fragmentary aspects only. Since marriage delay implies a comparative perspective—
generally compared to existing norms or expectations—the comparison of marriage 
schedules across birth cohorts can be a useful strategy for studying this topic.  
This study investigates how much marriage is delayed and to what extent the 
delay is made up later, namely, the marriage postponement and recuperation (P&R) 
process from the cohort comparative perspective. Looking at age trends in cohort first- 
marriage rates, I describe the marriage P&R process over birth cohorts and how that 
process has developed. I also examine whether the process differs across different levels 
of education. As a case study, I focus on South Korea, which has experienced rapid 
demographic changes and marked educational expansion. Based on recent trends in the 
marriage P&R process, I also provide cohort projection scenarios of marriage rates at the 
end of the reproductive span for upcoming cohorts that have passed primary marriage 
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ages. This study contributes to the literature by suggesting distinct insights into the 
dynamic changes in marriage timing.  
Change in Marriage Timing 
Marriage delay has become common in most industrialized countries over the past 
decades. In European countries and the U.S., women’s period-mean ages at first marriage 
were in the early 20s before the 1960s, but since then, mean ages have increased to the 
late 20s starting with Sweden and moving to Eastern European countries (Sobotka & 
Toulemon, 2008: 96, Figure 3). East Asian countries have also experienced a rapid rise in 
the age at first marriage. According to Jones and Gubhaju (2009), between 1970 and 
2005, women’s singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM) rose from 22–25 year of age to 
the late 20s and near 30 in most countries in the region except for China where most 
women still marry in their 20s. Marriage delay along with sustained low fertility makes 
demographic changes in both regions look similar.  
The trends in marriage delay, however, are quite different. During the first 
fertility transition, marriage timing changed little in most European countries. It is well 
known that the mean age at first marriage of the “European marriage pattern” was higher 
than in any other region of the world (Hajnal, 1965). SMAMs for women were mostly in 
the late 20s, and roughly 10–20% of women remained single at ages 45–49 in most 
Western European countries. The age of women’s marriages changed universally to 
younger ages soon after World War II, which contributed to a baby boom in the U.S. In 
Europe and the U.S, substantive marriage delay did not appear until the 1960s. Since 
then, marriage has continued to be delayed and frequently replaced with cohabitation in 
most countries, although this trend varies across and within countries.  
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In contrast, in East Asian countries, an increase in the age at first marriage has 
continued. Although data is not available for all countries, women’s SMAM was 21.2 in 
1920 for Japan, 21.1 in 1920 for Taiwan, and 15.9 in 1925 for Korea, and marriage age 
did not surpass age 23 until the 1960s in most countries in this region (Atoh, Kandiah, & 
Ivanov, 2004; Kwon, 2007), a clear distinction from the European marriage pattern. The 
rise in marriage age also contributed to fertility decline to some extent although the 
decline in this region was mainly attributed to a decline in marital fertility. The greatest 
difference is the universal marriage pattern in East Asia. The proportion of never-married 
women at age 45–49 was less than 2% in 1960, but still remained under 10% in 2005 in 
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea (Atoh, Kandiah, & Ivanov, 2004; Jones & Gubhaju, 
2009). East Asian countries entered post-transitional stages (or the second demographic 
transition) between the mid-1970s and early 1980s, but marriage delay has continued. 
Unlike European countries, cohabitation is not yet common and non-marital births are 
still rare (5% or below through the 2000s in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea). Thus, 
sustained marriage delay directly contributes to the lowest-low fertility in East Asian 
countries.  
Characteristic features of marriage delay in East Asia are relatively less known. 
With different histories and backgrounds, East Asian countries may have more dynamic 
patterns of marriage transition than Western countries. For instance, the mean age at first 
marriage in most East Asian countries rose close to its European counterparts or higher in 
recent years but non-marriage did not correspondingly increase. This suggests that 
considerable marriage-delay situations were made up in later ages, though the link 
between marriage delay and lifetime singlehood has gradually intensified. Such 
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“recuperation” might have been even stronger in the past given that the rise in age at first 
marriage has continued since the early twentieth century while celibacy rates (remaining 
single at ages 45–49) remained stable until recent years. Unlike Western countries, given 
the sustained trends, contemporary marriage delay in East Asia can be better understood 
from a long-term perspective. The factors that differentiate the recent marriage delay 
from earlier patterns can illuminate how marriage timing has changed in East Asia and 
sheds light on commonalities and differences of the second demographic transition 
between East Asian and Western countries.  
Marriage delay should be differentiated from non-marriage because not all 
marriage delays are linked to non-marriage. Oppenheimer (1988; 1997) claimed that 
educated women more often delay marriage but do not necessarily end up more non-
marriage as they also desire marriage and eventually marry later. This essentially 
describes the process in which delayed marriage is made up in late ages. The recuperation 
of marriage delay among educated women is confirmed by Goldstein and Kenney (2001), 
who reported a “crossover” of marriage rates between college graduates and non-
graduates among the 1954–1959 and 1960–1964 cohort: the cumulative proportion of 
ever-married women for college graduates was lower than for non-graduates in their 20s, 
but gradually increased and was projected to be higher than non-graduates. These studies 
noted the distinction between marriage delay and marriage forgone but missed the 
process of marriage recuperation.  
The recuperation of delayed marriage has not been properly conceptualized in the 
literature. Research frequently analyzes mean age at first marriage or the risk of marriage 
and compares it with the proportion of ever-married at the reproductive end. However, 
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such static measures have limits in exploring significant changes in marriage delay and 
the catching-up process. A few studies also build on a deterministic assumption of the 
marriage schedule using forecasting methods (e.g., Coale & McNeil, 1972). For instance, 
Goldstein and Kenney (2001) assumed the diffusion of marriage within women of a 
cohort to estimate cohort marriage schedules. This deterministic assumption on marriage 
timing might be useful for forecasting purposes, but it is unrealistic and might deviate 
from actual observations particularly in societies where marriage schedules rapidly 
change or depart from the standard distribution of marriage age. As a result, a lack of 
understanding exists on the frequency of marriage delays and actual recuperation.  
The marriage postponement and recuperation process differs by level of 
education. Generally, educated women delay marriage, but whether they end up with 
lower celibacy rates varies with context. The association between higher education and 
lifetime singlehood is positive or insignificant in less traditional societies such as Sweden 
and the U.S., but it is negative in gender-inegalitarian societies like Japan (Blossfeld, 
1995; Ono, 2003). In particular, educated women marry less and late even after 
controlling for school enrollment (Raymo, 2003). This suggests that the mechanism of 
family formation is different in places like East Asia where gender inequity remains 
substantive despite recent improvements. Thus, understanding the dynamic change in 
marriage timing should take into account regional contexts.  
In East Asian countries including Korea, educated women delay marriage more 
than other women. With economic independence, educated women are more likely to 
recognize and avoid the burdens of traditional gender roles and duties imposed on women 
(as wives, mothers, and daughters-in-law) regarding marriage and childbearing. Marriage 
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postponement and avoidance can be a useful strategy to avert such risks in societies with 
gender inequity (McDonald 2002). The tradition of hypergamy, women’s practice of 
marrying “up” to men with higher status, also makes it difficult for the most educated 
women to marry in East Asia. However, educated women are also more likely to get 
married eventually (marriage recuperation). Having more resources, educated women 
have advantages in overcoming the demanding process of finding a suitable partner in the 
marriage market, which requires substantive time and effort (Oppenheimer, 1988; 1997). 
This is in part evidenced by a recent increase in international marriages, that is, marriages 
between the most educated women in this region to men from more developed countries 
(e.g., Kim, 2010). Taken together, the educated groups of women are more likely to delay 
and recuperate marriage than others, resulting in marginal differences in celibacy rates at 
the reproductive end in East Asia. 
The marriage P&R process is complex and it is not yet well understood how much 
marriage is delayed, how much of the delay is made up in later life, and whether marriage 
delay eventually produces lifetime singlehood. Given trends in marriage delay in East 
Asia, the marriage P&R process will continue for an unknown period of time. This study 
measures the marriage P&R process from the cohort perspective and shows how this 
process has developed in South Korea as a case study in East Asia. This study also 
examines whether that process differs by level of education and how it might change in 
the near future.  
Marriage in the Context of Korea 
As other studies have summarized descriptive changes in marriage age and non-
marriage in Korea (see Kwon, 2007), I briefly overview the change in marriage timing. In 
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Korea, early marriage was the social norm in the Chosun Kingdom (1392–1910), which 
adopted Confucianism as a ruling ideology. In the Chosun pre-modern society, marriage 
was considered a union between two lineages that contributed to expanding and 
maintaining a family’s socioeconomic influence rather than a union between two 
individuals (Chang, 1979). Thus, parents arranged almost all marriages in the pre-modern 
period. Given the high mortality in a pre-modern society, early marriage might also be 
advantageous in achieving marriage’s first objective: the continuation of family lineage 
through sons.  
Since the first census in 1925, the mean age at first marriage has increased 
monotonically for both men and women (see Figure 3-1). SMAM was 20.2 for men and 
15.9 for women in 1925 and the proportion of never-married women by ages 20–24 was 
less than 2% until 1930 (Kwon, 2007). Korea’s early and universal marriage pattern was 
one of the earliest and greatest marriage patterns in the world at that time (Hajnal 1965: 
102).  
The substantial marriage delay first appeared between 1940 and 1955, when 
Korea experienced turbulent history during World War II, liberation in 1945, and the 
Korean War (1950–1953). The SMAM increased from 21.0 to 24.6 for men and 17.5 to 
20.5 for women during this period. The shift of age at first marriage was mainly due to 
massive migration and selective mortality caused by a series of political events. Wars and 
subsequent unrest triggered marriage delay for both men and women as well as 
unbalanced sex ratios at marriageable ages caused by wars (Lapierre-Adamcyk & Burch, 
1974).  
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Marriage rates began to decline while the mean age at first marriage continued to 
increase between the 1960s and the 1990s. Marriage delay has gradually continued 
through modernization and urbanization first and then through extended education and 
women’s participation in social and economic activities. The transition from arranged 
marriages to love marriages is also noteworthy. According to a national survey in 1991 
(Gong et al., 1992), arranged marriages that were completely determined by parents— 
which comprised 48% of the marriage cohort before 1964—almost disappeared for the 
marriage cohort after 1990 (1.2%).  
The Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998 also changed marriage patterns to a great 
extent. Economic constraints further delayed marriage and late marriage gradually 
became prevalent throughout the country. Young people became more aware of 
economic uncertainty when making important decisions in regards to careers, marriage, 
and childbearing. The SMAM finally surpassed age 30 for both men and women, with 
33.16 for men and 30.25 for women in 2010. In a period perspective, the period total first 
marriage rates—the sum of age-specific first marriage rates in a certain time or period—
have declined greatly since the late 1990s (Kwon, 2007:231-235). However, the 
proportion of never-married women at ages 45–49 was still 2.4% in 2005, suggesting that 
universal marriage has maintained in Korea.   
< Figure 3-1 is about here > 
The discrepancy between high SMAM and low non-marriage implies a strong 
recuperation of delayed marriage. Recent studies (Park, Lee, & Jo, 2013; Woo, 2009) 
confirmed the trend toward late and less marriage among recent cohorts. The studies 
indicated that educated women more often delay marriage but the gap in non-marriage is 
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minimal as the educated eventually marry at older ages. Park and colleagues (2013) 
found that the lowest educated (less than secondary education) began to show a non-
traditional marriage pattern—the greatest marriage delay and non-marriage, but due to 
the group’s marginal share, not much importance has been attributed.  
Both studies relied on a decade-birth cohort, probably due to the lack of sample 
size and they mainly focused on relatively recent trends, that is, changes in marriage 
timing after the late 1990s Asian financial crisis. Furthermore, apart from measurement 
issues, these studies used either the deterministic assumption of the Hernes model (Woo, 
2009) or the discrete time hazard model (Park et al., 2013). As a result, historic patterns 
of marriage delay and the recuperation process were omitted and overlooked in the 
literature.  
To address the research gap, this study investigated the degree to which a cohort 
of women postpones marriage and catches up in later ages. This study described the 
marriage P&R process, which has lasted in Korea from pre-transitional stages to the 
present, and demonstrates how that process differs by level of education.  
Measuring Marriage Postponement and Recuperation 
The concept of marriage delay is arbitrary and subjective. The ambiguity of 
marriage delay might impede a clear understanding of the dynamics of the marriage P&R 
process. Due to the subjective meaning of delay, no one can say whether an individual 
delays marriage until the person’s original plan and eventual outcome are known. That is, 
individual plans about marriage frequently change with conditions and life trajectories. 
However, such data is not widely available. At the aggregate level, however, the marriage 
schedule of a group can be compared with others. The marriage P&R process is 
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inherently a cohort phenomenon because staying single to the end of the reproductive 
cycle is an outcome of successive decisions and behaviors that cumulate over a life 
course (Ryder, 1951). Therefore, differences in marriage schedules over ages can be used 
to identify the marriage P&R process. Specifically, this study utilized the gap in the 
cumulative marriage rate in younger ages that continues through older ages as an 
evidence of marriage delay or marriage foregone at the aggregate level. Building on prior 
research (e.g., Frejka, 2011; Sobotka et al., 2012), I investigated the marriage P&R 
process by quantifying the extent of marriage delay and how much delayed marriage at 
early ages is then recuperated at later ages.  
As total fertility rates have declined in most developed countries in the past 
decades, demographers have begun to debate whether an actual decline in fertility exists 
or if it is just a matter of transitioning to childbearing in later ages. The latter is also 
called the “postponement transition (Kohler, Billari and Ortega, 2002).” Several of these 
debates have developed and elaborated a way to measure the postponement and 
recuperation of childbearing in a cohort fertility perspective (Frejka, 2012; Frejka & 
Calot, 2001; Frejka & Sardon, 2004; Lesthaeghe, 2001; Sobotka et al., 2012). Compared 
with previous cohorts, fertility decline in younger ages is considered as childbearing 
postponement while fertility gain in later ages is regarded as recuperation of delayed 
childbearing.4 Authors have measured the gap in cumulative cohort fertility rates over 
ages between two birth cohorts of interest (see the details for childbearing context, 
                                                 
4 I use marriage postponement and recuperation and marriage delay and catching-up interchangeably.   
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Sobotka et al., 2012). I applied this method to the marriage P&R process. To be specific, 
marriage postponement indicates an absolute (or relative) decline in cohort first marriage 
rate (CFMR), which is equivalent to the proportion of ever-married when the cohort of 
interest is contrasted with the benchmark. The postponement is measured at the age 
where the gap is maximized. Marriage recuperation is also measured by absolute (or 
relative) gains in the cumulative cohort marriage rate from the greatest gap.  
The way to measure the postponement and recuperation is also illustrated in 
Figure 3-2. Comparing two hypothetical cohort a and b, consider the older cohort a as a 
benchmark cohort. The cohort a’s CFMRs for ages 13–44 were considered as a baseline, 
which is a horizontal line at zero.5 For the cohort b, the age-specific difference in CFMRs 
from the benchmark is depicted as a trend line. The falling curve in the left side 
represents a decline in CFMR of the cohort b at younger ages compared to the benchmark 
(cohort a), while the rising curve on the right side indicates an increase in CFMR at older 
ages offsetting the marriage deficit in younger ages. Again, the decline in CFMR at 
younger ages is considered as marriage postponement (P), which is measured at the 
trough age with the greatest gap, and the subsequent rise in marriage rate at older ages is 
labeled as marriage recuperation (R). The ratio of marriage recuperation over 
postponement is computed as Recuperation Index (RI= P*100 / R). Three measures (P, 
R, and RI) are used for comparisons over cohorts across levels of education.  
                                                 
5 Since a few women reported that they married before age 15, I use 13 as the lower limit of the age range.  
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These measures can also be measured through a relational model that compares 
the cohort of interest with a moving benchmark, such as an immediate previous cohort 
(Lesthaeghe, 2001). The essential part of the relational model is identical with the base 
model except for setting a moving benchmark. Thus, I did not discuss it further here. In 
this study, I used this relational model only when the result of base model is not clear. 
<Figure 3-2 is about here> 
As the marriage P&R process is ongoing in Korea, key indicators in the base 
model could be utilized to formulate cohort projection scenarios. To project CFMR at age 
45, that is, the proportion ever-married by age 45, any cohort that reached the trough age 
could be used as shown in the equation below: 
𝑝𝐶𝑀𝑅𝑖 = 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 + 𝑃𝑖(1 − 𝑝𝑅𝐼𝑖), 
where i and p stand for the cohort of interest and the projected value, respectively.  
The formula illustrates that the projected CFMR at age 45 is equal to the CFMR 
of the benchmark plus the absolute postponement (P) at the trough multiplied by the final 
decline in CFMR, which is 1 minus the projected RI. The only variable to be projected is 
the pRI. As a prior study (Sobotka et al., 2011) pointed out, there are many ways to 
project recuperation. Considering data limitation, however, this paper adopted two 
approaches: keeping the most recently observed RI constant and using a linear trend from 
the recent two RIs.  
These methods provided a useful opportunity to quantify the marriage P&R 
process. A visualization of the marriage P&R process offers an intuitive understanding 
about the current state and how it has developed with regard to marriage. Three measures 
(P, R, and RI) also enabled us to compare differences in the dynamics of marriage 
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transition across cohorts and levels of education. Furthermore, these measures could also 
be used for variant cohort-projection scenarios of the proportion of ever-married.  
Data and Methods 
Data. This study used data from the 1975, 1990, 2005, and 2010 Korean census 
and 1% samples data in which age at first marriage is available. The Population and 
Housing Census of Korea is conducted by Statistics Korea every five years. The censuses 
include a short sample survey on demographics such as age, sex, education, and marital 
status as well as the occasional age at first marriage. Having larger sample sizes, these 
data were advantageous over others for estimating cohort-specific marriage schedules. 
From each available census, data on women aged 30–59 and their educational attainment 
were collected for this study. Considering the possibility of misreporting marriage age 
and possible selection by mortality differentials, I excluded the responses from women 
aged 60 or higher. Also, I included responses from women aged 30 and older only 
because most women complete their highest education before that age in Korea. For this 
study I also considered women who stayed single by age 45 as lifetime singlehood 
(celibacy). I acknowledged that women getting married in their 40s and 50s has increased 
in recent years. However, since a late marriage around the end of reproductive years is 
still rare, especially for a first marriage, I did not consider it for this study. Furthermore, 
using age 45 as an upper limit made it possible to include more recent cohorts into the 
analysis. As a result, the final analytic sample included 338,307 cases and a sample size 
for every 5-year birth cohort varies from a minimum of 4,886 to a maximum of 58,286 
cases. The subsample for the second part has 192,041 cases and a larger sample size for 
each cohort that ranges from 16,948 to 58,286 cases. 
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Analytic strategy. I employed the cohort analysis that was originally developed 
for the analysis of childbearing postponement. As described in the section above, this 
method was useful in demonstrating the shift of childbearing from younger ages to older 
ages. Taking advantage of the method, I applied it to the study of marriage timing. The 
analysis of this study is divided into three subsections: (1) historic change in the marriage 
P&R process, (2) recent variations by level of education, and (3) cohort projections based 
on trends in the marriage P&R process. In the first section, I provided a description about 
how the marriage P&R process has developed over the cohorts of women born between 
1916 and 1980. The graphical illustration demonstrates how marriage postponement has 
occurred and to what extent delayed marriage has ended with non-marriage. Key 
measures of the marriage P&R process are also summarized in a separate figure.  
The second section reviews a variation of the marriage P&R process across levels 
of education. Due to a substantive educational transition in Korea, I could not use the 
same educational categories for the entire cohorts analyzed in this study. I separate the 
cohorts into two groups, according to the cohort that entered the replacement level of 
fertility: the cohorts born before 1960 and the cohorts born in and after 1960. In the 
preliminary analysis, the older cohorts born before 1960 did not show much variation 
across levels of education (see Appendix A). Therefore, I focused on the younger cohorts 
born between 1956 and 1980, which most benefited from the expansion of higher 
education. Due to a small sample size for less educated groups, I used a five-year birth 
cohort, instead of a single-year birth cohort. I included the 1956–1960 cohort as a 
benchmark that represents the ending cohort of the first demographic transition to 
compare changes in the marriage schedule against toward the “modern” pattern.   
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Lastly, I provided cohort-projection scenarios of the ever-married proportion 
(CFMR). Key measures (P, R, and RI) of the marriage P&R process were utilized to 
make projections for the latest cohorts that passed the trough age. As the maximum 
postponement (P) was known for the cohorts that passed the trough, the CFMR at age 45 
could be easily computed once the recuperation index (RI) is estimated. I used two 
different approaches to estimate the RI for the purpose of comparison: stable RI and trend 
RI. I made education-specific projections with both stable RI and trend RI and then 
eventually integrated the education-specific trends and educational composition together 
into the projection scenarios for the entire cohorts. This was the simplest way to 
demonstrate the advantages of the projections that take into account the dynamics of the 
marriage P&R process.  
Results 
Trends in marriage postponement and recuperation. The trends of women’s 
marriage rate from the 1916–1920 cohort to the 1976–1980 cohort are illustrated in 
Figure 3-3. The upper graph (a) represents the survival curves of never-married women 
by age. From the far-left blue line for the 1916–1920 cohort to the far-right line for the 
1976–1980 cohort, the marriage schedule has continuously delayed in Korea. The cohort-
specific lines tend to converge around the bottom as they reach to age 45, suggesting that 
most women eventually marry in Korea. However, the younger cohorts born in and after 
the 1970s began to depart from these lines and show late and less marriage patterns to 
some extent. Generally, all of the survival curves gradually moved toward the right side 
over cohorts, which demonstrates the long-lasting marriage delay. However, it is still 
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difficult to say whether and to what extent delayed marriage was made up later in the 
figure.  
The lower graph (b) in Figure 3-3 illustrates the marriage P&R process over five-
year birth cohorts. The figure was transformed from the survival curves into the 
differences in CFMR by age and from the 1916–1920 benchmark cohort. The U-shaped 
curves represent how each cohort’s marriage schedule deviated from the benchmark. A 
descending slope on the left side represents a decline in CFMR in younger ages from the 
benchmark whereas an ascending slope on the right side illustrates the catching-up effect 
of delayed marriage in late ages. In graph (b), the U-shaped curve becomes deeper and 
wider over cohorts, implying that marriage delay intensified (deeper) while marriage 
recuperation was protracted (wider) over cohorts. The graph also demonstrates that 
marriage delay has continued over cohorts and that most delayed marriage was made up 
later, mainly in women’s late 20s and early 30s. By and large, the universal marriage 
pattern remains in Korea despite the long-lasting marriage delay.  
<Figure 3-3 is about here> 
Figure 3-4 summarizes the key measures of the marriage P&R process observed 
in Figure 3-3: postponement (P), recuperation (R), recuperation index (RI), and decline in 
CMFR at age 45. The upper graph (a) is derived from the base model that uses a fixed 
benchmark while the lower graph (b) is based on a relational model using a moving 
benchmark. All of these measures are documented in Appendix 3-A.  
In the graph (a) in Figure 3-4, marriage postponement (an absolute decline in 
CFMR at the trough age) has gradually increased over cohorts. The square mark, which 
indicates postponement (P), reached 0.840 for the latest 1976–1980 cohort without any 
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decline. In other words, the difference in CFMR was greatest at age 22, which is 84%p 
lower than the benchmark. The bar plots represent absolute recuperation (R) in CFMR 
from the trough by selected ages (30, 35, and 45 here). These bars reveal how much 
delayed marriage was made up by these ages. The key measures in the relational model 
are also summarized and illustrated in the lower graph (b). Comparing the two graphs in 
Figure 3-4 helps to determine a clearer trend in the marriage P&R process.  
As seen above, the postponement indicator (P) gradually increased from the 
1912–1920 cohort to the latest 1976–1980 cohort. Marriage postponement rapidly 
increased between the 1931–1935 and 1941-1945 cohort and leveled off until the 1961–
1965 cohort and then gradually increased afterwards. The recuperation index showed a 
near-complete recuperation effect until the 1956–1960 cohort, but began to depart from a 
complete catch-up from the 1961–1965 cohort and afterwards. As a result, the 
recuperation index (RI = 100*R / P) stayed around 95% in the base model and around 
85% in the relational model. The trend line for the final decline in CFMR stayed near flat 
but rose slightly among the cohorts born in the 1970s in the base model.  
It is notable that the postponement index suddenly became higher between the 
1926–1930 and 1931–1935 cohorts. The rise in postponement continued until the 1941–
1945 cohort and then stabilized in the following cohorts. The sudden rise in the 
postponement index through the 1931–1935 cohort to the 1941–1945 cohort was 
probably due to successive political turbulence in the 1940s and 1950s, which included 
World War II, liberation, and the Korean War. The wars and social unrest made young 
women delay their age of first marriage. An unbalanced sex ratio at the primary marriage 
ages due to wars might have also contributed to the delay. However, almost all marriage 
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delays were made up later before the women reached their 30s, which contributed to the 
baby boom after the Korean War. Stabilized postponement soon after the shift of 
marriage timing suggests that the cohorts that followed the war adopted the changed 
marriage schedule. Consequently, the wars and unrest brought about a shift in women’s 
marriage timing from the late teens to the early 20s, without a change in non-marriage.  
Another substantive rise in the postponement index appeared for the cohorts born 
in and after the 1960s. The intensity of marriage postponement continuously increased 
while the recuperation index gradually declined. Whereas the marriage delay almost 
recuperated for the cohorts born before 1960, parts of the delay began to end with non-
marriage, though it was still marginal. Interestingly, the 1961–1965 cohorts who 
experienced a marriage delay coincide with the cohort that first entered sub-replacement 
fertility in Korea (Yoo, 2014). The factors that caused low fertility, such as extended 
education, an increase in women’s social participation, and economic uncertainty, might 
have also influenced marriage delay.  
In short, marriage delay has continued through the entire cohorts observed in this 
study. In the context of long-lasting marriage delay, two substantive rises in marriage 
timing are noteworthy in Korea. The first major flow of marriage delay happened to 
women born in the 1930s and the early 1940s. The marriage postponement was 
remarkable, but non-marriage changed little due to a near-complete recuperation of 
delayed marriage. Political unrest and protracted destitution triggered the shift in 
women’s marriage age from the late teens to the early 20s. The second flow happened to 
women born in and after the 1960s, who showed below replacement fertility. Marriage 
postponement gradually increased while recuperation began to decline. Furthermore, the 
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divergence between marriage postponement and recuperation directly led to a rise in non-
marriage. The two flows of marriage delay are distinct and contribute to the differences 
between the first and second demographic transition in Korea.  
<Figure 3-4 is about here> 
Difference in trends by level of education. The pattern of marriage P&R can be 
further divided by level of education. As described, I separated the pattern into two 
groups, the cohorts born before 1960 and the cohorts born in and after 1960. The 
marriage P&R process for the 1916–1920 and 1956–1960 cohorts does not differ much 
by level of education (Figure 3-5). The groups with “incomplete secondary” and 
“secondary and more” show minor fluctuations in marriage schedule among older cohorts 
born in the 1920s, but these are mainly due to relatively small group sizes for higher 
education. Except for that part, the marriage P&R process looks similar across levels of 
education until the 1956–1960 cohort. This suggests that the first flow of marriage delay, 
which was mainly caused by successive wars, affected all social groups of women 
indiscriminately. As the pattern is straightforward, I do not discuss it further here. 
<Figure 3-5 is about here> 
Figure 3-6 displays the dynamics of the marriage P&R process for the 1956–1960 
and 1981–1985 cohorts. These cohorts commonly show sub-replacement fertility and 
benefited most from the expansion of higher education, which began in the 1980s. The 
1956–1960 cohort is considered as a benchmark. I used four educational categories here: 
“incomplete secondary,” “secondary completion,” “some college,” and “bachelor and 
more.” By and large, the marriage P&R process looks similar across the four levels of 
education. The younger cohorts tend to delay marriage more and the majority of marriage 
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delay was made up later. However, the extent and pace of recuperation differ slightly by 
level of education.  
For women with incomplete secondary education, the marriage schedules 
gradually delay over cohorts while recuperation is also protracted. One of the salient 
features for the lowest educated is that the reversal of marriage delay appears among the 
latest cohort. The marriage schedule for the latest 1981–1985 cohort is higher than that of 
the 1976–1980 cohort, suggesting an advance in the marriage schedule. In a prior study 
(Park et al., 2013), the 1976–1980 cohort with incomplete secondary education showed 
the greatest marriage delay, even greater than the most educated. In contrast, the latest 
1981–1985 cohort shows the reversal of marriage delay in this study. More cohorts need 
to be cumulated in order to understand whether this pattern is transient or systematic. 
Furthermore, since the share of the group is less than 5% for the cohort, the reversal of 
the marriage P&R among the least educated has a minimal impact.  
Other educational groups show a similar pattern with different paces. The 
marriage P&R parabola becomes deeper and wider as they reach the latest cohort. The 
trough moved toward the right side, from the mid-20s for the 1961–1965 to the late-20s 
for the 1966–1970 cohort for all levels of education except for the least educated. The 
deeper troughs reflect growing marriage delay over cohorts while the drooping upward 
slopes represent extending recuperation. The protracted recuperation of delayed marriage 
increasingly results in non-marriage.  
The marriage P&R process is still ongoing in all levels of education except for the 
least educated. The extent of postponement is most pronounced among the most 
educated, that is, women with bachelor’s degree or more: in the base model, it was 0.482 
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for the 1981–1985 cohort while other groups remain 0.378 or lower. The postponement 
index is positively associated with level of education except for the least educated. In 
contrast, the recuperation index (RI) varies with level of education although women with 
tertiary education—both “some college” and “bachelor or more”—reveal higher 
recuperation than others.  
The marriage P&R process does not differ much by level of education until the 
cohorts born in the 1960s. For the cohorts born in and after the 1960s, however, the 
marriage P&R process starts to diversify by level of education although most groups still 
share the overall direction. The least educated women display the reversal from marriage 
delay while the most educated continue to show the greatest postponement and 
recuperation (in absolute value). As marriage delay continues while recuperation 
declines, there are enough grounds to expect the decline of universal marriage in the 
country.   
<Figure 3-6 is about here> 
Projection scenarios of cohort first marriage rate. The marriage P&R and 
variation across levels of education suggest that more drastic changes in marriage could 
emerge in the near future. To check the possible changes beforehand, I provided cohort 
projection scenarios of CFMRs at age 45 for the cohorts that pass the trough age in the 
analysis above. Key measures from the analysis were utilized to estimate the ongoing 
marriage P&R process.  
In Figure 3-7, the upper graph (a) depicts the observed and projected CFMRs at 
women aged 45 for four different educational groups. Despite the decline in CFMR at 
age 45 since the 1956–1960 cohort, it never fell below 0.95 until the latest 1966–1970 
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cohort. This confirms a strong universal marriage tradition in Korea. Given the trends in 
the graph, nobody can deny that the CFMRs would decline further. However, the 
question is to what extent and how fast it would decline. Figure 3-7 includes four levels 
of education with two different projected lines for each: stable RI and trend RI. Note that 
all key indicators were based on the 1956–1960 benchmark.  
The CFMR at age 45 declined in all levels of education. For instance, CFMRs 
were 0.94 or above in all levels of education for the 1956–1960 cohort but none of the 
projection scenarios stayed above 0.90 except for the least educated with stable RI (0.94). 
For the least educated, both projected lines (stable RI and trend RI) had a moderate 
decline first and then a slight rebound at the latest 1981–1985 cohort, which reflects the 
reversal from marriage delay as discussed above. Other educational groups shared clear 
downward trends, but both groups with tertiary education, “some college” and “bachelor 
or more,” stood out in pace. For example, the most educated (“bachelor or more”) with 
trend RI projects the greatest drop in CFMR—as low as 0.67 among the 1981–1985 
cohort. The same group with stable RI projects a relatively moderate drop in CFMR, but 
it also reaches 0.82 for the latest cohort. Having a greater change in the marriage P&R 
process, the most educated had a wider range of projections than others.  
In places like Korea where marriage delay continuously increases, stable RI and 
trend RI can both be considered extreme scenarios for projecting CFMRs for upcoming 
cohorts. As the projections take into account trends in both marriage delay (P) and the 
recuperation index (RI), an ultimate level of CFMRs at age 45 would not deviate much 
from either scenario, especially for the cohorts that already reached the trough.  
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These education-specific trends can be readily used for projecting CFMRs for all 
of the cohorts. The graph (b) in Figure 3-7 includes four different projection scenarios. 
Two of them are ordinary stable RI and trend RI projection scenarios from the base 
model with the 1956–1960 benchmark. The other two projection scenarios take into 
account both education-specific trends (stable RI and trend RI, respectively) and 
educational composition for the corresponding cohorts. To be specific, the education-
specific trends estimated above were multiplied by educational compositions that were 
observed in 2010. The projection scenarios that are considered education-specific trends 
show a wider gap between stable RI and trend RI. These lines display lower levels of 
CFMR at age 45 than the ones that do not consider education. The difference is the 
greatest in the lower limit for the 1981–1985 cohort (0.47 vs 0.74). Given the educational 
variation in marriage P&R and the rapid change in composition in Korea, the new 
method based on education-specific trends could be better for projecting changes in 
CFMR for upcoming cohorts.   
< Figure 3-7 is about here> 
Discussion and Conclusion  
Over the past decades, a delay in marriage has appeared in most developed 
countries. In European countries and the U.S., marriage delay is involved in a rise in non-
marriage, cohabitation, and non-marital births, but there is a paucity of information on 
East Asia where long-term trends in marriage delay have also occurred. This study 
explores the marriage P&R process and how it differs by level of education by 
quantifying marriage delay and the extent of catching-up in late ages. This study also 
extends its attention to historical patterns to determine whether a recent pattern is 
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distinctive and how it differs from previous patterns. By utilizing graphical illustrations, 
this study describes how women’s marriage schedule has changed over the cohorts in 
Korea, as a case study of East Asian countries.  
Marriage delay has continued through both first and second demographic 
transitions in Korea. There have been two substantive marriage delays. The first major 
delay appeared among women born in the 1930s and early 1940s, when they faced 
successive political turbulence from World War II, liberation, and the Korean War. In 
period, marriage delay was almost completely made up later during a postwar period, 
without a change in spinsterhood. However, this pattern eventually altered women’s 
primary ages for first marriages—from late teens to early 20s. A noticeable marriage 
delay occurred again for cohorts born in and after the 1960s that eventually reached 
replacement fertility. This trend, which has continued, seems headed for a prolonged 
form. The extent of marriage delay has gradually increased while the extent of 
recuperation has become protracted and declined with regard to the latest cohorts. 
Marriage recuperation still remains strong, but the proportion of ever-married at the end 
of the reproductive span is clearly on the decrease. 
Educational variation also distinguishes the ongoing process from the previous 
one. The marriage P&R process did not differ much across levels of education until the 
1960 cohorts and then began to diverge across educational groups. For the cohorts born 
in and after the 1960s, the P&R process was the most pronounced among the most 
educated group, which displayed the greatest marriage delay and catching-up effect in 
absolute value. In contrast, the least educated group showed a reversal of marriage delay 
among the latest cohort, which deviates from the ordinary pattern. However, this reversal 
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is negligible, as it comprised the smallest share of the overall population. Except for the 
least educated, women’s education is positively associated with greater marriage delay, 
but recuperation varies with level of education. Projection scenarios based on trends 
suggest that future young cohorts could experience greater divergence in CFMR across 
levels of education. When such differentials and educational compositions are taken into 
account, it is estimated that the proportion of ever-married women at age 44, which has 
never gone below 0.95, could reach to 0.85 at least and to 0.47 at the greatest for the 
1981–1985 cohort.  
The findings of this study contribute to the literature. This study sheds light on the 
historical pattern of marriage delay in East Asia. I demonstrate that the recent 
development of marriage delay in Korea is not only different from its Western 
counterpart but it is also distinguished from the country’s own prior experience. For 
instance, women’s mean age at first marriage became similar or higher than European 
countries during the period when non-marriage was still rare. The absence of prevailing 
cohabitation and substantive marriage recuperation distinguish marriage delay in East 
Asian countries from that in Western countries. Marriage delay during the first 
demographic transition cannot be found in the European marriage pattern. Furthermore, 
the difference in marriage recuperation (near complete vs. partial recuperation) between 
the first and the second demographic transition has been overlooked in the literature. 
Such distinctions advance our understanding of demographic transitions and add 
narratives to the discussion about the multiple aspects of the second demographic 
transition and variation across regions (e.g., Lesthaeghe 2010; Sobotka 2008).  
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Understanding the marriage P&R process also helps to better project CFMRs in 
the near future. Drastic changes in marriage timing and variation across social statuses 
make it difficult to forecast how marriage patterns might change. In this study, the 
projections based on the marriage P&R process suggest a range of possible changes for 
upcoming young cohorts. Considering the educational variation as well as compositional 
changes improve both the reliability and validity of the projections.  
This study also includes a few limitations. The measure of marriage postponement 
is subject to the benchmark cohort in the base model. Following the suggestions made by 
a prior study (Sobotka et al. 2011), this study set the earliest cohort available as a 
benchmark, regarding it as the beginning cohort of the transition. A different benchmark 
might lead to different trends in marriage delay, but it should not alter the results of this 
study. A relational model that uses an immediate previous cohort as a benchmark also 
supplemented the robustness issue. Furthermore, due to data limits, I am not able to 
investigate further about changes in marriage. Reasons for marriage delay and 
information on union formation other than marriage are not available. Additionally, I do 
not consider men’s marriage in this study in order to focus on the relevance to fertility 
and nuptiality. Given the hypergamy tradition and the positive association between men’s 
education and marriage, the least educated men are more likely to delay marriage and 
delayed marriage is less likely to be made up. Additional research on men’s marriage will 
uncover a different mechanism for men’s marriage delay and variation across social 
groups.  
This study describes how the marriage delay has developed in Korea. The link 
between marriage delay and recuperation began to slacken among recent cohorts of 
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women. Given trends in marriage delay, the share of non-marriage could increase to a 
greater extent in the near future. The collapse of universal marriage and greater variation 
across social groups may begin in earnest in a couple of decades. However, it is also 
doubtful whether cohabitation and non-marital births will spread in Korea as much as in 
Europe and if so, whether these trends will appear in the least educated or the most 
educated women. Furthermore, it is interesting to know whether the historic bimodal 
pattern of marriage delay in Korea is also observed in the rest of the East Asian countries. 
Answers to these questions will definitely contribute to our understanding of marriage 
timing and demographic transitions.  
 
 
  
 74 
  
Table 3-1  
Women’s Marriage Postponement and Recuperation between the 1916–1920 Cohort and 1976–1980 Cohort  
Birth Cohort Postponement (P) Age at Trough  Recuperation (R) at Age  Recuperation Index (RI = R/P) 
 30 35 40 45  30 35 40 45 
 a. Base model, compared to the 1916–1920 cohort 
c1916–1920 0.000 0  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1921–1925 0.068 18  0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069  1.015 1.009 1.007 1.005 
c1926–1930 0.102 19  0.099 0.101 0.102 0.102  0.979 0.999 1.006 1.002 
c1931–1935 0.341 20  0.337 0.341 0.341 0.340  0.989 0.999 1.000 0.997 
c1936–1940 0.504 20  0.493 0.502 0.503 0.502  0.979 0.997 0.999 0.997 
c1941–1945 0.607 20  0.590 0.603 0.604 0.603  0.971 0.994 0.995 0.994 
c1946–1950 0.652 21  0.609 0.635 0.640 0.642  0.935 0.975 0.983 0.985 
c1951–1955 0.665 21  0.612 0.638 0.645 0.648  0.921 0.959 0.969 0.974 
c1956–1960 0.718 21  0.639 0.681 0.692 0.696  0.890 0.948 0.964 0.969 
c1961–1965 0.734 21  0.632 0.677 0.696 0.704  0.860 0.921 0.948 0.958 
c1966–1970 0.787 21  0.633 0.703 0.730 0.741  0.804 0.893 0.928 0.942 
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c1971–1975 0.812 22  0.574 0.678 0.722   0.706 0.835 0.889  
c1976–1980 0.840 22  0.463 0.648    0.551 0.772   
 b. Relational model, compared to the immediate previous five-year cohort  
c1916–1920 0.000 0  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1921–1925 0.068 18  0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069  1.015 1.009 1.007 1.005 
c1926–1930 0.046 21  0.043 0.045 0.046 0.046  0.931 0.985 1.001 0.996 
c1931–1935 0.243 20  0.241 0.243 0.242 0.242  0.993 0.999 0.997 0.995 
c1936–1940 0.169 21  0.163 0.168 0.169 0.169  0.962 0.994 0.999 0.996 
c1941–1945 0.161 22  0.154 0.159 0.159 0.159  0.956 0.985 0.984 0.988 
c1946–1950 0.059 22  0.034 0.046 0.050 0.053  0.574 0.783 0.855 0.893 
c1951–1955 0.033 24  0.023 0.022 0.024 0.026  0.698 0.679 0.725 0.785 
c1956–1960 0.073 23  0.047 0.063 0.068 0.068  0.638 0.858 0.923 0.928 
c1961–1965 0.057 24  0.033 0.037 0.045 0.048  0.583 0.644 0.791 0.851 
c1966–1970 0.104 25  0.052 0.077 0.085 0.089  0.506 0.745 0.820 0.855 
c1971–1975 0.125 27  0.041 0.076 0.092   0.326 0.602 0.732  
c1976–1980 0.181 28  0.042 0.123    0.235 0.681   
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Figure 3-1. Singulate Mean Age at First Marriage for Men and Women, 1925-2010 
 
Note: SMAMs for 1945 and 1955 are not available. 
Source: Kwon (2005) for 1925–2005; Statistics Korea for 2010.  
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Figure 3-2: The Conceptual Illustration of Measuring Marriage Postponement (P), 
Recuperation (R), and Recuperation Index (RI). 
 
Source: Frejka (2012) and Sobotka et al. (2011). 
 
  
Figure 3-3. Change in Women’s Marriage Timing between the 1916–1920 Cohort and the 1976–1980 Cohort. 
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Figure 3-4. Graphical Summary of the Marriage Postponement and Recuperation between the 
1916–1920 Cohort and the 1976–1980 Cohort, South Korea. 
a. Base model 
 
b. Relational model 
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Figure 3-5. Marriage Postponement and Recuperation by Level of Education between the 1916–1920 Cohort and the 1956–1960 
Cohort, South Korea. 
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Figure 3-6. Marriage Postponement and Recuperation by Level of Education between the 1956–1960 Cohort and the 1981–1985 
Cohort, South Korea. 
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Figure 3-7. Projection Scenarios with Stable RI and Trend RI for Cohort First Marriage 
Rate (Ever-Married) at Age 45 to the 1981–1984 Cohort of Women. 
a. Education-specific projection scenarios with stable RI and trend RI 
 
b. Projection scenarios for the entire cohort, w/ and w/o education-specific trends 
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CHAPTER 4 
FERTILITY CONCENTRATION 
Introduction 
 Reproductive concentration indicates the extent to which childbearing is 
unequally distributed within women in a population. The unequal distribution of 
childbearing, which always exists due to heterogeneity in fertility preferences and 
behaviors, can cause compositional changes of population in ethnicity, religiosity, and 
social status and may result in considerable changes in political influence (Hout, Greeley, 
& Wilde, 2001; Kaufmann, Goujon, & Skirbekk, 2012). The consequences of 
reproductive concentration are also linked to socioeconomic variations such as changes in 
kinship support for the elderly, housing demand, consumer goods, social mobility, and 
socialization (Lutz 1989). For instance, the rise in childless women may increase the 
demand for a better social security system that compliments kinship support for the 
elderly. In a scenario in which childbearing is increasingly concentrated in a certain 
subpopulation, inequality issues can also arise with regard to child-rearing, which 
requires considerable time, effort, and resources. As in most cases, fertility is negatively 
associated with social status, that is, women with a lower social status are more likely to 
have many children, which could cause the burden of child-rearing to deteriorate their  
already-inferior status and is likely to transfer over generations (Mare, 1997).  
As fertility falls below replacement level, parity distribution has more 
implications than ever before. In most societies, low fertility is accompanied by an 
increasing share of childless women, which contributes to the unequal distribution of 
childbearing. Increasing childlessness not only leads to the unequal burden of child-
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rearing but also is related to reproducing generations. An increase in childless women 
implies that the average number of children among mothers, which excludes childless 
women, paradoxically increases. That is, the gap in the average number of children ever 
born between mothers (without childlessness) and women (with childlessness) increases 
with the rise in childless women. Childless women literally do not reproduce children 
who can contribute to the next generation. As mothers’ fertility is transmitted to 
daughters’ family size, children that grow up with more siblings in childhood may have a 
higher family size than their mothers’ generation—including childless women— even if 
the mothers’ generation has low fertility (Lutz 1989). Depending on parity distribution 
and the correlation of fertility levels between mothers and daughters, this aspect may 
have a positive impact on improving low fertility or at least delaying further decline 
(Lutz, Skirbekk, & Testa, 2006).  
Despite the significance and possible policy implications, there is a dearth of 
literature on reproductive concentration. Research on reproductive concentration usually 
measures the unequal distribution of childbearing and examines how it changes over 
cohorts (Lichter & Wooton, 2005; Lutz 1989; Shkolnikov, Andreev, Houle, & Vaupel, 
2007; Spielauer, 2005; Vaupel & Goodwin, 1987). Interest in childbearing inequality 
later extended to comparative studies such as whether reproductive inequality increases 
across countries (Dorius 2008; Giroux, Eloundou-Enyegue, & Lichter 2008). However, 
these studies are not well connected to each other and main outcomes are also 
inconsistent across studies. Research on inequality across countries has also used period 
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fertility rates that were conducted with arguable or contestable methods.6 Interestingly, 
most studies rely heavily on the Lorenz curve to measure the unequal distribution of 
childbearing, but this raises a question of whether the measure, which is taken from 
economics, is appropriate for the analysis of parity distribution (Barakat, 2014). 
Furthermore, the literature mainly focuses on European countries and the U.S., or 
available data from developing countries (e.g., the Demographic Health Survey) to find a 
generalized pattern without considering regional contexts. In such a discussion, countries 
in East Asia like South Korea, which has experienced rapid fertility decline and 
socioeconomic changes in the past decades, have been missed.  
This study explores reproductive concentration in South Korea. The country has 
experienced rapid fertility decline in the past decades and is currently under the lowest-
low level of fertility. The marked decline in fertility along with recent low fertility make 
the country a better place for studying the dynamic relationship between level and 
concentration of fertility. Building on prior studies, this study applies three measures of 
reproductive concentration (the concentration ratio, the Kolm index, and statistical 
                                                 
6 For instance, Giroux and colleagues (2008: 189) utilized the coefficient variance (CV) for fertility 
inequality, which is obtained from Firebaugh (1999). According to their description, 𝐶𝑉2 =
[∑ 𝑤𝑖(1 − 𝑟𝑖)
2𝑘
𝑖 ], 𝑤𝑖  indicates the relative size of education groups, 𝑖 indexes education groups and 
represents the ratio of the group’s total fertility rates to the national rates.  However, based on the original 
form of income inequality in Firebaugh (1999: 1623), 𝐶𝑉2 = (1/𝑁) ∑ (1 − 𝑟)2𝑖 , N indicates the number of 
ranked income groups, and thus should be the number of parity groups in a parity context instead of 
educational groups. The 𝑤𝑖  in Giroux et al. (2008) seems due to a misinterpretation of the 1/𝑁. 
 86 
 
dispersion) to South Korea, as a representative case of the developing countries outside 
Europe. In this study, I first review the trends of reproductive concentration over cohorts 
and test the applicability of the three measures. I then examine the relationship between 
the level and concentration of fertility and its variation across levels of education and find 
a non-linear relationship. The merit and faults of the three concentration measures are 
also discussed. This study contributes to our understanding of unequal distribution of 
childbearing by adding empirical evidence on the association between level and 
concentration of fertility to the literature.  
Reproductive Concentration and Measures 
 Reproductive concentration represents how much the number of children is 
unequally distributed in a group of women, mostly in a birth cohort. Vaupel and Goodwin 
(1987) first introduced the measure7 using a Lorenz curve to measure the proportion of 
women that have half of the children (have-half). The concentration ratio (CR), which is 
frequently used as a measure of income inequality in economics, is measured by the ratio 
of the Lorenz curve over the area under the diagonal when the cumulative proportion of 
women is plotted over the cumulative proportion of children in a parity context. In their 
analysis of the U.S., the CR was relatively high in the early twentieth century due to the 
coexistence of higher fertility and a higher share of childlessness and then began to 
decline when the cohorts born in the 1920s and 1930s entered the baby boom. The 
                                                 
7 The term of reproductive concentration also differs by studies. While most studies use “reproductive 
concentration” and “fertility concentration,” a few studies also use “fertility inequality” and “fertility 
dispersion.” This study does not distinguish these terms and uses them interchangeably.   
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introduction of the CR sheds light on qualitative aspects of quantitative parity 
distribution, which had not received much previous attention. Research interest in fertility 
concentration has intermittently continued, but findings have been ambiguous and have 
taken several directions: descriptive findings (Lichter & Wooton, 2005), fertility 
inequality across countries (Dorius, 2008; Giroux, Eloundou-Enyegue, & Lichter, 2008), 
and seeking general patterns with regard to fertility level, education, and others (Barakat, 
2014; Lutz, 1987; Shkolnikov et al., 2007; Spielauer, 2005). The majority of these studies 
employed the CR, which is essentially equivalent to the Gini coefficient in economics. 
Questioning the propriety of using the Gini coefficient in a parity context, a few studies 
also utilized different measures of fertility concentration, such as the absolute index of 
inequality and variance (Barakat, 2014; Dorius, 2008; Giroux et al., 2008). However, 
there is no agreement on the measures of fertility concentration despite the significance 
of in-depth discussions of fertility concentration.  
Major research outcomes are also mixed and, as yet, inconclusive. A main 
question in the literature is whether fertility concentration is patterned by level of fertility. 
With the World Fertility Surveys, Lutz (1989) found that the CR is negatively associated 
with level of fertility in most countries except for China.8 In his analysis, the CR tended 
to increase with fertility decline in most places, while it exceptionally leveled off in 
China. However, subsequent studies did not support the negative association between 
level and concentration of fertility. For instance, the CR has decreased with fertility 
                                                 
8 He also explains that unlike other countries, strong family planning programs and the one-child policy in 
China might have an “egalitarian” impact on parity distribution. 
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decline since the post-war baby boom period in most European countries and rebounded 
recently as the number of childless women has risen in these countries (Shkolnikov et al., 
2007; Spielauer, 2005).  
The association between level and concentration of fertility is often further 
expanded into variation across social classes. Lutz (1989) argued that the negative 
association between the two is robust across social statuses, such as regions (urban and 
rural) and educational groups. That is, any group with higher fertility shows a lower level 
of fertility concentration. For example, educated groups tend to have lower fertility than 
others, which, in turn, is connected to a higher CR level. Recent research, however, 
reports that the association between the CR and women’s education is inconsistent across 
European countries (Shkolnikov et al., 2007). Specifically, the CR was the highest among 
the most educated group of women in Western countries whereas the opposite was the 
case in Eastern European countries. In particular, the CR rise was the greatest among the 
most educated for recent cohorts in Austria, probably due to the rise in childless women 
for the corresponding group (Spielauer, 2005). These inconsistencies across studies might 
be attributed to differences in data, area, period, or sample population. For instance, 
Lutz’s analysis was based on maternal fertility data from developing countries. In 
contrast, latter studies have focused on European countries that are mostly in late- or 
post-transitional stages. Such differences in contextual effects, along with the gaps in 
fertility levels, interrupt identifying an actual aspect of the association between level and 
concentration of fertility. However, a fundamental problem might also exist on the 
measures of fertility concentration as well.  
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The CR was originally designed to measure the “relative” inequality of income 
distribution. As the number of children is a count data, parity distribution is essentially 
different from income distribution and thus cannot be regarded as the same unit. Perhaps 
the debates on the association between level and concentration of fertility might be built 
on a weak foundation. Barakat (2014) pointed out the misapplication of the income 
inequality measure to the parity distribution in the literature. In a parity context, the 
relative difference between having one child and having three children cannot be 
comparable to the difference between having two children and having six children. The 
existence of childlessness also makes the concentration of fertility distinct from income 
distribution. Consequently, Barakat introduced the absolute index of inequality (Kolm 
index) and statistical dispersion (variance-to-mean ratio), suggesting that using three 
different measures of concentration can provide multidimensional aspects of fertility 
concentration that complement each other.  
The Kolm index is one of absolute inequality measures (Kolm, 1976a; 1976b). It 
is invariant to an extra unit change in everyone’s income, which is also said to be 
translation invariant. Simply, the index regards the difference between having two 
children and having three children as the same difference between having one child and 
having two children. Such an index is based on an absolute difference, rather than a 
relative difference and therefore is considered more appropriate for count data. The index 
of statistical dispersion, which is called a variance-to-mean ratio (VMR), is also 
appropriate for count data. The VMR is actually used to describe whether the distribution 
is over-, equi-, or under-dispersed in the reference to the given mean of Poisson 
distribution. Roughly speaking, over-dispersion indicates the distribution is more 
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concentrated than the theorized (Poisson) distribution for the mean while under-
dispersion implies the distribution is less concentrated. Strictly speaking, the VMR is a 
measure of dispersion, but can also be interpreted as the extent of concentration for the 
mean.  
Barakat (2014) found that any of the three concentration measures has a non-
linear relationship with the level of fertility. For instance, the trends in VMR have a cubic 
relationship, more precisely as a “slanted S-shaped” pattern, with fertility level. From 
pre-transitional stages to the post-transitional stages of low fertility, the statistical 
dispersion as a measure of fertility concentration moved from equi-dispersion (VMR=1) 
to over-dispersion (VMR>1) with a peak around fertility of 4–5. It then dropped to under-
dispersion (VMR<1) until around the sub-replacement level and then rebounded to equi-
dispersion in very low fertility. Such S-shaped trends were also observed in the two other 
measures of fertility concentration—the CR and the Kolm index. However, the S-shaped 
trend is the first argument about a non-linear relationship between the level and 
concentration of fertility. Despite compelling trends in fertility concentration, the 
interpretation that both the beginning and end of changes would converge around the 
equi-dispersion is also arbitrary and superficial.  
Accordingly, literature on fertility concentration has not yet been well established 
and therefore needs further investigation. The primary measure of concentration, the CR, 
is incomplete and reflects only a part of fertility concentration. Utilizing three measures 
of concentration together can be a useful alternative but this approach has only been 
applied in a single study. Furthermore, the countries that were examined in prior studies 
tend to be biased toward European countries and the U.S. Although a set of developing 
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countries was included in the aggregate-level analysis, regional variations and country- 
specific contexts were mainly overlooked. Research out of Western countries is definitely 
lacking. In addition, few scholars often collect empirical data from many different 
countries and use it to detect global trends. However, the collection of fragments does not 
necessarily represent the whole picture. For instance, the experience of demographic 
transition in Western countries, which has taken a couple of centuries, is far different 
from that of developing countries out of Europe; that is, the latter is much more intense 
and compressed. It is doubtful whether the findings based on Western countries would be 
replicated in other countries even if fertility rates reach a similar level. In this sense, 
empirical data that spans the period from the pre-transitional to post-transitional stage of 
very low fertility could be a great contribution to discussions on fertility concentration.  
This study explores fertility concentration in Korea. Taking advantage of an 
extensive span of cohort data, I investigate the trends in fertility concentration and a 
variation with the level of fertility over the demographic transition. Specifically, I look at 
how fertility concentration has changed over the women of cohorts born between 1921 
and 1970. I then discuss the merits and faults of the three measures— the CR, the Kolm 
index, and VMR. I also examine the relationship between level and concentration of 
fertility, whether there is any general pattern and if so, how it differs by level of 
education. This study also tests whether previous study trends found in Western nations 
are replicated in the context of East Asia. Since the process of fertility decline in Korea 
was already described in Chapter 2, I do not repeat it. Furthermore, I also use the same 
analytic data with in this chapter, the only difference being that I add the 1966 census 
into the data to secure more cohorts that cover the pre-transitional stage. Thus, the 
 92 
 
analyzed cohorts in this study include women born between 1921 and 1925. Country 
background and data description can be found in Chapter 2.   
Three Measures of Fertility Concentration 
 Following prior research (Barakat, 2014), I considered three different but closely 
related measures of fertility concentration—the CR, Kolm index, and VMR. As 
mentioned, the CR is based on the Lorenz curve. The cumulative number of women is 
placed on an x-axis in a reverse order of birth parity from the highest to childlessness 
while the cumulative number of children is located on a y-axis. The ratio of the area 
between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal over the one under the diagonal becomes the 
CR (see Shkolnikov et al., 2007 for further details). The CR is scale invariant, which 
indicates that it does not change when proportionally equivalent births are added into the 
existing parity (Barakat, 2014). As a result, the CR can be interpreted as relative 
inequality of childbearing distribution; the difference between having one child and 
having two children is regarded as the same difference between having two children and 
having four children. Previous studies have also utilized havehalf and halfhave, that is, 
determining the proportion of women who have half of the children and what proportion 
of children have half of the women. Both measures, havehalf and halfhave, are derived 
from the intersection of the Lorenz curve with the horizontal and vertical lines of 50 
percentiles, respectively. As these measures are highly correlated with the CR, it is better 
to consider these as two CR variants rather than independent ones. For that reason, I did 
not consider the two measures separately and just focused on the CR in this study in order 
to simplify the analysis and to avoid unnecessary confusion.  
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 The second measure is the Kolm index, which represents an absolute level of 
unequal distribution of childbearing. Simply, it measures the difference in number of 
parities from the mean. Unlike the CR, this index considers the difference between 
childlessness and having a child as the equal difference between having a child and 
having two children. It is translation invariant and thus often preferred for count data 
(Barakat, 2014). The Kolm index of inequality is defined as:  
𝐾𝛼(𝑋) =
1
𝛼
𝑙𝑜𝑔(
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑒𝛼(?̅?−𝑋𝑖)𝑛𝑖=1 ). 
In the formula, 𝛼 indicates the degree of sensitivity to inequality. This study also sets 𝛼 = 
0.1 as in the previous study (Barakat, 2014). 𝑋𝑖 indicates the number of parity for ith 
individual.  
Lastly, I also considered VMR as a measure of fertility consideration. VMR is an 
index of statistical dispersion and thus represents whether the variation is over-dispersed, 
equi-dispersed, or under-dispersed. Compared with the other two measures, VMR is 
easily measured with the mean and variance only. As the VMR is originally designed for 
Poisson distribution, it also fits well with the distinctive features of parity distribution. 
VMR is 1 for the Poisson distribution, but could vary with the form of distribution in a 
parity context. Simply, VMR represents the extent of fertility concentration for a 
corresponding level of fertility. With these measures of concentration, I explored fertility 
concentration in Korea according to the following criteria:  (1) periodic changes, (2) the 
association with level of fertility, and (3) the association with level of education. I first 
reviewed how fertility concentration has changed over 50-year cohorts, from the 1921 
cohort to the 1970 cohort. Then, I contrasted the change in fertility concentration over the 
level of fertility. The association between level and concentration of fertility can be 
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manifested with more cases. Thus, I also disaggregated each cohort into six different 
educational groups and examined the association between level and concentration of 
fertility. The last section of the analysis examines how the association differs by women’s 
levels of education. The six educational categories, which cover the rapid transition in 
women’s educational attainment in Korea, include “less than primary,” “primary,” “lower 
secondary,” “upper secondary,” “some college,” and “bachelor or higher,” as in Chapter 
2. Some educational groups are very small in some cohorts. To avoid possible bias 
caused by small sample size, I used five-year birth cohort, instead of a single-year cohort, 
as far as educational variation is concerned. Furthermore, educational groups that occupy 
less than 1% of the corresponding cohort were not represented for the same reason. The 
analysis with three different measures of concentration not only provides different 
perspectives on fertility concentration but also offers an opportunity to test the pros and 
cons of the measures.  
Results  
 Trends in fertility concentration and underestimation. In general, complete 
parity distribution is positively skewed as women with extreme numbers of children 
always exist in most societies. In such cases, high-order births are often censored and 
aggregated at the highest available parity and parity distribution is expressed in an 
abridged table. For instance, the Human Fertility Database, the online database of fertility 
data, uses six categories for parity distribution from childlessness to the fifth parity and 
higher; in turn, women with five children or more are grouped together into “parity 5+.” 
For many developed countries with low fertility, censoring and grouping high-order 
births have negligible effects on computing fertility rates and fertility concentration 
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because few women have more than five children in such settings. For developing 
countries with high fertility, however, such grouping could lead to biased results in the 
level and concentration of fertility, which would subject to the highest category for the 
parity average number of children for the category. Grouping high-birth parities around 
four or five can mislead fertility concentration in high fertility countries.  
 Here, I briefly demonstrate this with the case of Korea. Completed cohort fertility 
has steadily declined over the female cohorts born between 1921 and 1970 (Figure 4-2). 
The cohort fertility was 5.75 among women born in 1921 but reached sub-replacement 
level for those born in the late 1950s and then further declined to 1.73 among those born 
in 1970. As a result, completed fertility has declined by more than one-third for the last 
50-year birth cohorts. The marked decline in fertility implies that fewer and fewer women 
reach high-order parities, and in turn, contribute to the decline in fertility concentration.  
< Figure 4-2 is about here > 
Figure 4-3 illustrates the underestimation of both the CR and the Kolm index, in 
which higher order births are aggregated. VMR is not shown as it does not necessarily 
require the highest parity for the computation. In both figures of the CR and the Kolm 
index, the uppermost solid line represents trends in fertility concentration using the 
complete parity distribution. Compared to the solid line of the complete distribution, the 
dotted lines for the abridged distributions show lower fertility concentrations for the old 
cohorts with high fertility. The gaps across lines are more pronounced among women 
born in the 1920s and 1930s. The extent of underestimation increases as more parity is 
aggregated. The dotted lines of the abridged distributions tend to converge to the solid 
line in which only a marginal number of women fall into the highest category.  
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A tendency to underestimate can be misleading in determining the trends in 
fertility concentration over cohorts. For instance, the CR moderately declined over birth 
cohorts despite a slight increase among recent cohorts. However, that could be differently 
interpreted as a rising trend if parity 4+ or parity 5+ was used as the highest category. 
The bias caused by aggregating higher parity makes it difficult to identify the actual 
trends in fertility concentration and the relationship with other factors like fertility rates 
and level of education. Figure 4-3 points to the need for reexamining the relationship 
between fertility concentration and other variables because some studies using the CR 
were built on abridged parity distributions. Furthermore, this indicates that a chance 
always exists for underestimation of fertility concentration when research utilizes 
samples data. Since the range of sample distribution is narrower than that of population 
distribution, fertility concentration based on survey samples is more likely to be 
underestimated although it might be negligible.  
Figure 4-4 represents the trends in three measures of fertility concentration (CR, 
Kolm index, and VMR) over the cohorts born between 1921 and 1970. All three 
measures share descending trends although the patterns differ slightly. Fertility 
concentration has declined through the entire cohorts but showed signs of a reversal 
among recent cohorts born in the mid-1960s and after. To be specific, CR trends maintain 
a very moderate gradient until the 1960 cohort and show a slight rise near the end. The 
fluctuated slope of the CR, which is close to a rugged plain, is in contrast to a monotonic 
decline in other two measures of concentration. The moderate fluctuations in the CR are 
evidence that the measure is sensitive to the change in parity distribution. The reversal of 
the trend around the 1960 cohort, followed by the rise in the CR, reflects an increasing 
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share of childless women among recent birth cohorts in the context of low fertility. That 
reversal also happened almost simultaneously with the entry into the sub-replacement 
level of cohort fertility around the 1960 cohort. Taken together, as a relative index of 
inequality, the CR is more elastic than the other two measures in illustrating the rise in 
childless women, as well as the change in parity distribution.  
 Both the Kolm index and the VMR show very similar trends, but the VMR points 
more upwards at the right end. As the Kolm index is based on absolute differences, minor 
changes in parity distribution in a low fertility context scarcely influence the index. The 
Kolm index is thus relatively very stable over cohorts as well as less sensitive to the rise 
in childlessness than other measures. Nonetheless, the Kolm index clearly shows that the 
absolute level of fertility concentration has continuously declined for the observed 
cohorts. The VMR also confirms what other measures showed: the variance of parity 
distribution was over-dispersed for the cohorts born in the early 1920s but soon became 
under-dispersed and continued to decline. The extent of under-dispersion has intensified 
over cohorts but began to show signs of rebound around the cohorts born in the 1960s. 
The pattern is consistent with that of the CR although the reversal around the end has a 
more restrained form.  
The relationship between level and concentration of fertility. The relationship 
between level and concentration of fertility, which is one of the main interests of this 
study, is illustrated in Figure 4-5. As completed cohort fertility has monotonic declining 
trends over cohorts, Figure 4-5 showing the three measures is bilaterally symmetric with 
Figure 4-4, which reveals cohort changes. In Figure 4-5, the CR graph (a) does not show 
any clear pattern. From right to the left on the graph, the CRs slightly declined first 
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(completed fertility between 5 and 6) leveled off (between 2.5 and 5), declined again until 
the sub-replacement level, and then began to surge under the replacement level. Due to 
the drastic and frequent changes of the CR, it is difficult to define the relationship with 
regard to the level of fertility because neither a linear nor a quadratic line fits the trends. 
Roughly speaking, however, the figure suggests that the CR is positively associated with 
fertility decline overall until the replacement level of fertility, and then turned into a 
negative association in settings with low fertility.  
 The two other measures of concentration, the Kolm index and the VMR, show a 
clearer pattern against the level of fertility. In Figure 4-5, the two measures (b and c) are 
positively associated with the level of fertility at a glance. Fertility concentration clearly 
decreased with fertility decline and the only difference appeared around sub-replacement 
level of fertility. The Kolm index was congested and stagnant at the sub-replacement 
level and lost its direction whereas the VMR clearly showed a recovery track around the 
same point. The obvious contrast between the two measures demonstrates a rise in 
fertility concentration, according to an increase in childlessness, which was negligible in 
the perspective of absolute inequality.  
 The patterns in Figure 4-5 become clearer if more cases are secured. I 
disaggregated each cohort into six educational groups and plot the exact same figure into 
Figure 4-6. For a better-fitted line, I dropped educational groups that occupied less than 
1% for each cohort as mentioned before. Figure 4-6 essentially displays the same pattern 
shown in Figure 4-5, but it also provides a different view about the relationship with the 
level of fertility. In the first graph, the CRs gradually declined as fertility declined but 
then soared around the sub-replacement level. However, again, it is hard to find any 
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particular pattern with the level of fertility. The range of variation around the replacement 
level well reflects the CR sensitivity to the change in childlessness. For both the Kolm 
index and the VMR, the positive slope wanes as fertility reaches around the cohort 
fertility of 1.9 and eventually becomes a negative association with the level of fertility. 
Both measures display a quadratic relationship, rather than a linear relationship, with the 
level of fertility. The trends show the right side of the parabola only, which is closer to a 
J-shaped pattern with the vertex around completed fertility of 1.8–1.9. The quadratic 
trends also have more explanatory power than the linear ones in both graphs.  
 Among the three measures of fertility concentration, the drastic and frequent 
changes in the CR trends are distinguishable from the other two measures. The CR trends 
are more sensitive to changes in parity distribution whereas the Kolm index trends are 
less sensitive, particularly in the context of low fertility. One aspect in common across 
the three measures is that fertility concentration has a positive association with the level 
of fertility overall, but the association turns around in the sub-replacement level of 
fertility toward a negative association. The dynamic change in the trends supports an 
argument that fertility concentration has a non-linear relationship with fertility level, as a 
prior study suggested (Barakat, 2014).  
Educational variation in fertility concentration. Another research question is 
whether fertility concentration differs by level of education, that is, whether fertility 
concentration is higher among more educated groups. Educational groups that occupy 
marginal share (less than 1%) for the corresponding cohort, were omitted here. Figure 4-7 
illustrates education-specific concentration measures over birth cohorts during the 
fertility transition in Korea. The negative relationship between fertility concentration and 
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level of education, which has been claimed in the literature, is not observed in Figure 4-7. 
Rather, the most educated group, “bachelor degree or more,” generally shows the lowest 
concentration across the three measures. However, the negative association between 
fertility concentration and education also shows signs of change. Two groups of tertiary 
education, “some college” and “bachelor or more,” show a slightly higher concentration 
than the “higher secondary” group among the cohorts born in the 1960s, which is 
probably due to the increasing share of childless women for those with higher education.  
Education-specific concentration is drawn against the level of fertility in Figure 4-
8. As seen above, a quadratic relationship is assumed for all levels of education and 
presented as a dotted trend line in each graph. In the concentration ratio graph (a), the 
trends vary with level of education. The vertexes of the quadratic lines spread through 
different levels of fertility while all slopes change from a positive to a negative direction 
as fertility declines in all educational groups. In contrast, the Kolm index graph (b) shows 
a coherent pattern across educational groups. Although all trend lines commonly 
represent the right part of the parabolas in the graph, the vertexes tend to converge around 
the completed fertility of 1.9.  
Interestingly, the VMR graph (c) is located between the CR and the Kolm index. 
As in other graphs, the highest educational group displays the lowest concentration, but 
no regular pattern is found with regard to the education-level relationship. It is notable 
that the higher educational groups tend to have a steeper slope than others. In other 
words, more educated groups have a much narrower parabola except for the group of 
“some college.” If the “some college” is grouped into tertiary education along with the 
“bachelor degree or more” group, the pattern becomes more manifested. The more 
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educated group of women have more responsive parity distribution to a change in the 
fertility level, which is also consistent across three measures. That is, a change in parity 
distribution has been more active among the most educated for the cohorts observed in 
this study.  
Discussion and Conclusion  
 Reproductive concentration is derived from a simple measure of how many 
women have half of the children in a given population. Childbearing and child-rearing 
require substantive resources and efforts. Given the frequent negative association 
between women’s fertility and social status, disadvantaged women are more likely to face 
the heavy burden of rearing many children in addition to their already inferior social 
status. Changes in parity distribution also reflects shifts in household size and structure, 
thus offering an idea of what to expect in diverse areas in the near future from 
preferences in consumer goods ranging from sizes of dinner tables to social security 
reform, including elderly support (Lutz, 1989). However, research on fertility 
concentration remains limited and findings are inconsistent across studies. The ambiguity 
of concentration measures also makes it difficult to identify the relationship between the 
level of fertility and education.  
Building on prior studies, this study applied three measures of fertility 
concentration—the CR, Kolm index, and the VMR—to the case of Korea, which has 
experienced rapid decline in fertility in the late twentieth century. Despite variation 
across measures, fertility concentration in Korea has gradually declined until the 1960 
cohort, which reached replacement fertility but then began to rebound among recent 
cohorts of women. The reversal of the trend is most pronounced in the relative index of 
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inequality, the CR, whereas it remains small or negligible in the absolute level of 
inequality (Kolm index) and the index of dispersion (VMR). Probably, the shift from a 
descending trend into an ascending trend is attributable to the recent rise in childlessness 
among women of younger cohorts especially for educated women.  
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, I find that the 
standardized dispersion, the VMR, is most appropriate for the analysis of the developing 
countries that have experienced a rapid decline in fertility if one must choose among the 
three measures. The VMR is not only stable, but it also accurately reflects change in 
childlessness among latest cohorts. The CR is too sensitive to change in parity 
distribution while the Kolm index is less responsive. In addition, both measures are 
underestimated when different higher order births are grouped together into the highest 
category especially in places with high fertility.  
Second, this study also finds that fertility concentration has a non-linear 
relationship with the level of fertility. As in many European countries, the downward 
trend in fertility concentration reversed itself around sub-replacement fertility in Korea. 
The rebound of concentration makes the trend a quadratic J-shaped curve, which disputes 
a linear relationship in the earlier literature. Given that the highest cohort fertility is 
below 6 in this study, the J-shaped curve between level and concentration of fertility 
might be overall in line with the slanted S-shaped curve, claimed in a prior study 
(Barakat, 2014). Unlike the J-shaped curve in this study, the S-shaped curve includes 
another negative parabola around the pre-transitional level of fertility. That part could be 
truncated in this study due to the absence of high fertility above 6.0, but it needs further 
investigations.  
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Lastly, the three measures of fertility concentration are overall negatively 
associated with levels of education. In general, less educated groups show greater fertility 
concentration, which contradicts some earlier works in the literature. However, that 
pattern has changed among recent cohorts born in the 1960s and later. On the one hand, 
fertility concentration rose for the least educated greater than for others, which might be 
due to the combination between marriage decline and the rise in childlessness for this 
group. However, as the share of the group is negligible (less than1%), its impact to 
overall population is also negligible. On the other hand, the fertility concentration of two 
groups with tertiary education—“some college” and “bachelor and more”—is higher than 
that of the “upper secondary” group among the latest cohort. The relative rise in fertility 
concentration for the educated groups is consistent with prior research (Spielauer, 2005), 
although the increase is not as great as in the earlier study. Since the majority of women 
(more than 95%) complete secondary or tertiary education in Korea, this change has 
important implications. The change evidences that parity distribution becomes 
increasingly diversified among the most educated—although more women remain 
childless, the progression to higher parity is more prominent in this group (Yoo 2014). 
Distributional change in childbearing may be more important than we expect. As 
discussed in Lutz (1989), change in parity distribution can be related to diverse issues 
such as children’s socialization, parents’ consumption propensity, the housing market, the 
education market, and kinship support. However, above all that, difference in parity 
distribution can have demographic leverage for reproducing future generations. For 
example, suppose two countries have the exactly same cohort fertility around 1.8 but with 
different parity distributions. One country has more diversity in parity distribution, which 
 104 
 
consists of a high share of childless women and a wide range of women with children. In 
contrast, another country has a narrower distribution, which has few childless women, the 
great majority of whom have one or two children. A minor difference in parity 
distribution could make a big difference in fertility over generations even for moderate 
correlations between mothers’ and daughters’ fertility (Lutz, 1989; Lutz, Skirbekk, & 
Testa, 2006). Thanks to a relatively large share of childless women, the children in the 
former country are more likely to grow up with many siblings in their childhood while 
those in the latter country have no siblings or perhaps one. The gap between the two 
countries will continue to grow over generations as far as the correlation of fertility 
between mothers and daughters is consistent, regardless of its strength. In that sense, 
having more diversity in parity distribution can be more advantageous for countries that 
want to avoid extremely low fertility. On the contrary, having narrower parity distribution 
can be helpful for preparing coherent and uniform policies such as support for childcare 
and the elderly. It may also be possible for child-rearing and parenting to be shared in a 
more effective way that could ultimately contribute to improvement in well-being for 
both parents and children.   
The former case is close to Western countries such as Sweden and the U.S., while 
the latter is closer to the situation in East Asian countries, especially South Korea. The 
parity distribution of Korea, where more than half of the women have two children and 
there are a negligible number of childless women, is likely a product of structural and 
contextual effects that includes culture, economic conditions, and public policies if 
randomness is taken for granted. Family-planning programs and nation-wide campaigns 
have established the desirability of small family size from the early stages of 
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development. Building a normative family size was a fine strategy to achieve fertility 
decline in the past, but it also resulted in a monotonic parity distribution, which might 
obstruct a rise in fertility. It would be interesting to investigate whether the difference in 
parity distribution brings about a different demographic outcome in the next generation.  
 Fertility concentration has declined in Korea to the point where cohorts have 
reached sub-replacement fertility. However, fertility concentration began to rebound 
among birth cohorts born in the 1960s and later, probably due to the rise in childless 
women. The growing amount of childlessness and a highly selective progression to high 
parity in the country are expected to push the fertility concentration further up. However, 
the overall level of concentration is still much lower than in European countries. In 
settings such as East Asia where low fertility has sustained in the past decades, interest in 
parity distribution could increase among experts and policy makers due to policy 
implications. As most Social Security policies are centered on families in East Asia, 
serious inequality issues could arise with regard to childcare and elderly support if the 
share of childlessness increases as much as in European countries. Research on the causes 
and consequences of different parity distribution will expand our knowledge of 
demographic changes and contribute to establishing a theoretical basis for further 
research.   
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Figure 4-1. Total Fertility Rates of Korea and Developed Countries, 1960–2010. 
 
Sources: Korean National Statistics Office (2012); Eurostat (2012). 
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Figure 4-2. Completed Cohort Fertility for Women in Cohorts Born between 1921 and 
1970. 
 
Sources: The author’s own calculation. 
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Figure 4-3. Underestimation of the Concentration Ratio and the Kolm Index with Various 
Highest Parity Categories.  
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Figure 4-4. Trends in Three Measures of Fertility Concentration over Birth Cohorts. 
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Figure 4-5. Trends in Three Measures of Fertility Concentration over Level of Completed Cohort Fertility 
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Figure 4-6. Level and Concentration of Fertility among Disaggregated Educational Groups. 
 
Note: Educational groups that represent less than 1% of the samples for the corresponding cohort, were omitted in this figure.  
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Figure 4-7. Trends in Three Measures of Fertility Concentration by Level of Education. 
 
Note: Educational groups that represent less than 1% of the samples for the corresponding cohort, were omitted in this figure.  
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Figure 4-8. Level and Concentration of Fertility by Level of Education. 
 
Note: Educational groups that represent less than 1% of the samples for the corresponding cohort, were omitted in this figure.  
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I address three different themes—fertility differentials, 
marriage delay, and fertility concentration—that expand our knowledge of changes in 
fertility and family formation. The first theme explores the dynamic association between 
women’s educational attainment and fertility particularly in settings where the fertility 
decline process has been intense and compressed. The second theme focuses on the 
marriage postponement and recuperation process and how it has changed in settings that 
have a universal marriage tradition. The third and final theme focuses on distributional 
change in childbearing and how it relates to fertility level and education. 
 The three papers addressing the aforementioned themes, are among the first few 
investigations that discuss the long-term process of demographic transitions in East Asia 
from pre- and early-transitional stages to the post-transitional stages—the entry stage of 
the second demographic transition. Despite extensive literature, empirical research that 
embraces multiple generations is rare particularly among countries outside Europe. As a 
result, each of these papers provides an opportunity to understand how demographic 
behaviors have differentially changed across levels of education over the transition from 
high to very low fertility. The Korean case illustrates how demographic changes 
gradually filter through different groups in a society and eventually contribute to 
upending old traditions such as high fertility and universal marriage in developing 
countries.  
 The first paper examines the pattern of educational differentials in cohort fertility. 
Fertility differentials by level of education have gradually declined and eventually 
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converged around the cohorts that reached replacement fertility. Falling fertility has 
shifted from the most educated to the least educated in a very compressed period. The 
expansion of higher education has played an important role only for the birth cohorts 
born after the 1960s. Consequently, the role of education in fertility decline was more 
pronounced in the diffusion of innovative ideas and behaviors rather than directly 
impacting fertility.  
The second paper describes two substantial transitions in marriage timing in the 
context of a long-lasting marriage delay. Political turbulence including World War II and 
the Korean War triggered the first shifts in women’s marriage age for the cohorts born in 
and after the 1930s, from the late teens to the early 20s. The following cohorts 
successfully settled the changed marriage schedule without returning to the traditional 
pattern. Another shift appeared among women born in and after the 1960s. The marriage 
delay further increased while the recuperation of delayed marriage began to protract and 
diminish for the more recent cohorts. Unlike in previous decades, in which nearly all 
delayed marriages were made up later, more marriage delays appear to end in non-
marriage and such a trend is more pronounced among the most educated women. Given 
trends in marriage P&R process, it is projected that the collapse of universal marriage is 
not far away in Korea.  
 Regarding fertility concentration, the study finds that the association between 
concentration and level of fertility shows a J-shaped relationship with converging 
vertexes around sub-replacement fertility. The fertility concentration has begun to 
rebound around sub-replacement fertility probably due to the increasing share of childless 
women. The steeper slope for the educated group reflects more varied childbearing 
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behaviors among advantaged groups. Unlike in European countries, parity distributions 
are centered on the mean and neighboring parity while childless women remain marginal. 
The lack of variation in parity distribution reflects the fact that childbearing behaviors in 
Korea are strongly influenced by cultural and structural factors such as social norms and 
economic constraints related to parenthood. Apart from this, the paper also finds that both 
relative and absolute indexes of inequality require special attention when applied to 
populations with high fertility due to the possibility of underestimation.  
The findings of the dissertation illustrate how fertility and marriage patterns have 
changed over generations ranging from a tumultuous period to an advanced economic 
period. In the postwar period that led to desolation and destitution, all possible means to 
improve the standard of living—such as the delay of marriage and contraceptive use that 
might have been against traditional norms—were easily and widely accepted by the 
public. During the period of modernization and industrialization, the conjugal family with 
two children—later changed to one child—was encouraged as an ideal family by 
authorities. Fertility and family formation converged as the social norm until the cohorts 
born in and after the 1960s. Often called the “democratization generation,” this group 
benefitted from the expansion of higher education in the 1980s and actively participated 
in a movement for democracy against dictatorships. This generation was also 
distinguished by their differences in childbearing and marriage. Marriage and 
childbearing behaviors began to diversify and variation by social groups also increased. 
The economic uncertainty caused by the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s further 
accelerated demographic changes such as low fertility and marriage delay.  
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 Three papers of this dissertation together coincide in demographic trends, 
“convergence towards diversity.” These papers commonly show that childbearing and 
marriage behaviors tend to have standardized for the first demographic transition while 
these are being diversified for the ongoing second demographic transition. Within the 
cohorts analyzed in this dissertation, differences in number of children have declined and 
eventually almost disappeared after the cohorts born in the 1960s. Women’s age at first 
marriage has also continuously extended, but more women began to end with lifetime 
singlehood from the cohorts that reached sub-replacement fertility. As an outcome, a 
share of childless women started increasing among recent cohorts.  
East Asian countries may share these demographic trends to varying degrees. 
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea share rapid economic growth, extended education, and 
population policies. China is also in line with these countries’ experiences. Rapid 
urbanization and industrialization as well as strong family planning programs might have 
resulted in standardized behaviors with regard to childbearing and marriage. Extended 
education and improvements in female status may create diversity in these behaviors. 
Economic uncertainty and different responses by social status can also contribute to 
differences in demographic behaviors.  
Most societies that have entered the second demographic transition may share 
these demographic trends, convergence towards diversity. In general, demographic 
transition is closely related to economic growth and modernization. In a process which 
diverse parts in a society are modernized, children’s socialization and education also tend 
to be standardized by public schooling system. Then, childbearing and marriage 
behaviors are more likely to change into a more standardized form. This change might be 
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gradually reversed as extended education and increased accounts of individualism 
transform ways of childbearing and union formation. Childbearing is separated from 
marriage while marriage declines in contemporary advanced societies. As a result, 
childbearing and union formation are increasingly diversified. Structural effects, policy 
effects, and regional circumstances may accelerate or delay these trends. Otherwise, 
different contexts may lead to different demographic trajectories. The topics on these 
demographic trends across regions and countries will remain a promising field of 
research.  
Men’s childbearing and marriage may be different from women’s. Men’s 
education is positively associated with fertility in Western countries (e.g., Lappegård & 
Rønsen, 2013; Nisén et al., 2014). Given men’s breadwinning role and hypergamy 
tradition in East Asia, educated men are expected to have higher number of children. Due 
to lack of data, however, little is known about educational differences among men in this 
region and thus, this topic remains to be proven by future research. Timing of marriage 
and the extent of marriage delay can also differ by gender. In the context of hypergamy, 
where women marry up with men with higher status, the lowest status men and the 
highest status women have difficulty in finding an appropriate partner. This is evidenced 
by recent rise in international marriage for the corresponding groups in South Korea 
(Kim 2010). Accordingly, less educated men are more likely to delay marriage while less 
likely to recuperate it in later ages. Research on educational differences in men’s 
marriage timing will shed light on different mechanisms of marriage market between men 
and women.  
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This dissertation offers important implications for further research and policy 
efforts. As shown, marriage is increasingly delayed and is expected to further decline for 
a period of time. Given the strong attachment of childbearing to marriage, cohort fertility 
will not rebound in the near future unless drastic social changes happen that encourage 
out-of-wedlock births. Policies that lower the barriers (e.g., youth unemployment and 
housing) to marriage and accommodate diverse forms of families can alleviate the 
sustained low fertility and rapid aging of the population. Research on cohabitation and 
non-marital births will be instrumental for understanding possible trajectories not only in 
Korea but also in other East Asian countries. Non-marriage could be more pronounced 
among the most educated women in the near future, but it does not necessarily 
accompany a rise in cohabitation and out-of-wedlock births for the group. Cohabitation 
and non-marital births appear first in the most educated women and subsequently spread 
from the lowest educated to others, similar to what happened in the U.S. where marriage 
is still preferred for most people. Longitudinal data including contraceptive use, 
pregnancy history, and partnership history, regardless of sex and marital status, could 
considerably improve our understanding of how young people respond to diverse societal 
and economic changes, which would eventually contribute to establishing better policies. 
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Appendix 2-A. Median Age at First Marriage for Women Born between 1926 and 1980, 
South Korea 
Cohort Median age Cohort Median age Cohort Median age Cohort Median age 
c1926 18 c1940 22 c1954 23 c1968 25 
c1927 18 c1941 22 c1955 23 c1969 25 
c1928 18 c1942 23 c1956 23 c1970 25 
c1929 18 c1943 23 c1957 23 c1971 26 
c1930 19 c1944 23 c1958 23 c1972 26 
c1931 19 c1945 23 c1959 23 c1973 26 
c1932 20 c1946 23 c1960 24 c1974 27 
c1933 20 c1947 24 c1961 24 c1975 27 
c1934 20 c1948 24 c1962 24 c1976 27 
c1935 20 c1949 24 c1963 24 c1977 27 
c1936 21 c1950 24 c1964 24 c1978 28 
c1937 21 c1951 23 c1965 25 c1979 29 
c1938 22 c1952 23 c1966 25 c1980 29 
c1939 22 c1953 23 c1967 25   
 Note: Author’s calculations with a life-table method, based on women’s age at first 
marriage from the Korean census sample data of 1980, 1995, 2005, and 2010; Extra birth 
cohorts of women born between1971 and1980 were added to provide recent trends in the 
timing of marriage. 
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Appendix 3-A. Marriage P&R Process by Education between the 1916–1920 Cohort and the 1956–1960 Cohort: Base Model 
 Postponement (P)  Age at the trough  Recuperation (R) at age  Recuperation Index (RI = R/P) 
   30 35 40 45  30 35 40 45 
Incomplete primary              
c1916-1920 0.000    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1921-1925 -0.049  18  0.048 0.049 0.050 0.050  0.980 0.994 1.017 1.026 
c1926-1930 -0.058  21  0.055 0.056 0.059 0.058  0.944 0.975 1.011 1.005 
c1931-1935 -0.256  19  0.252 0.255 0.255 0.255  0.984 0.997 0.999 0.998 
c1936-1940 -0.397  19  0.391 0.394 0.396 0.394  0.984 0.992 0.997 0.993 
c1941-1945 -0.463  20  0.447 0.456 0.457 0.457  0.964 0.983 0.986 0.986 
c1946-1950 -0.469  20  0.429 0.449 0.457 0.457  0.915 0.958 0.974 0.974 
c1951-1955 -0.487  20  0.431 0.449 0.454 0.461  0.885 0.921 0.933 0.947 
c1956-1960 -0.545  22  0.437 0.461 0.478 0.487  0.802 0.846 0.877 0.894 
Primary completion              
c1916-1920 0.000    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1921-1925 -0.057  19  0.064 0.060 0.057 0.057  1.117 1.047 0.995 0.995 
c1926-1930 -0.066  21  0.070 0.069 0.066 0.067  1.059 1.050 1.000 1.018 
c1931-1935 -0.288  20  0.293 0.290 0.288 0.288  1.017 1.008 1.000 1.001 
1
3
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c1936-1940 -0.432  20  0.432 0.433 0.432 0.432  0.998 1.003 0.998 1.000 
c1941-1945 -0.514  20  0.512 0.514 0.513 0.514  0.997 1.001 0.998 1.000 
c1946-1950 -0.518  21  0.503 0.511 0.512 0.515  0.970 0.985 0.988 0.994 
c1951-1955 -0.502  21  0.474 0.489 0.491 0.495  0.945 0.975 0.979 0.986 
c1956-1960 -0.514  22  0.470 0.490 0.497 0.502  0.914 0.954 0.968 0.977 
Incomplete secondary              
c1916-1920 0.000    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1921-1925 -0.027  27  0.004 0.023 0.023 0.023  0.145 0.829 0.829 0.829 
c1926-1930 -0.034  27  0.019 0.027 0.034 0.034  0.556 0.810 1.000 1.000 
c1931-1935 -0.242  20  0.219 0.234 0.239 0.241  0.902 0.965 0.986 0.993 
c1936-1940 -0.355  21  0.323 0.346 0.351 0.352  0.911 0.975 0.989 0.992 
c1941-1945 -0.455  22  0.417 0.443 0.448 0.450  0.915 0.973 0.984 0.989 
c1946-1950 -0.454  21  0.408 0.436 0.442 0.445  0.899 0.961 0.975 0.981 
c1951-1955 -0.422  21  0.370 0.398 0.406 0.411  0.877 0.943 0.962 0.973 
c1956-1960 -0.434  22  0.370 0.404 0.415 0.421  0.852 0.930 0.957 0.971 
Secondary completion or more              
c1916-1920 0.000    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1921-1925 -0.044  18  0.048 0.049 0.050 0.050  0.980 0.994 1.017 1.026 
1
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c1926-1930 -0.063  18  0.055 0.056 0.059 0.058  0.944 0.975 1.011 1.005 
c1931-1935 -0.241  22  0.252 0.255 0.255 0.255  0.984 0.997 0.999 0.998 
c1936-1940 -0.384  23  0.391 0.394 0.396 0.394  0.984 0.992 0.997 0.993 
c1941-1945 -0.470  23  0.447 0.456 0.457 0.457  0.964 0.983 0.986 0.986 
c1946-1950 -0.424  23  0.429 0.449 0.457 0.457  0.915 0.958 0.974 0.974 
c1951-1955 -0.408  22  0.431 0.449 0.454 0.461  0.885 0.921 0.933 0.947 
c1956-1960 -0.439  22  0.437 0.461 0.478 0.487  0.802 0.846 0.877 0.894 
 
  
1
3
2
 
 133 
 
Appendix 3-B. Marriage P&R Process by Education between the 1916–1920 Cohort and the 1956–1960 Cohort: Relational 
Model 
 Postponement  
(P) 
 Age  
at the trough  
 Recuperation (R) at age  Recuperation Index (RI = R/P) 
   30 35 40 45  30 35 40 45 
Incomplete primary              
c1916-1920 0.000    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1921-1925 -0.049  18  0.048 0.049 0.050 0.050  0.980 0.994 1.017 1.026 
c1926-1930 -0.030  22  0.027 0.028 0.029 0.029  0.924 0.961 0.994 0.966 
c1931-1935 -0.204  19  0.203 0.204 0.203 0.203  0.996 1.003 0.995 0.996 
c1936-1940 -0.141  19  0.139 0.139 0.140 0.139  0.983 0.982 0.993 0.983 
c1941-1945 -0.117  21  0.106 0.112 0.111 0.113  0.913 0.962 0.955 0.969 
c1946-1950 -0.034  23  0.010 0.022 0.028 0.028  0.309 0.639 0.836 0.839 
c1951-1955 -0.033  23  0.017 0.015 0.013 0.019  0.509 0.448 0.378 0.580 
c1956-1960 -0.105  25  0.054 0.060 0.071 0.074  0.512 0.567 0.677 0.699 
Primary completion              
c1916-1920 0.000    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
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c1921-1925 -0.057  19  0.064 0.060 0.057 0.057  1.117 1.047 0.995 0.995 
c1926-1930 -0.035  23  0.032 0.035 0.035 0.036  0.918 1.017 1.007 1.043 
c1931-1935 -0.224  20  0.225 0.223 0.224 0.223  1.005 0.995 1.001 0.996 
c1936-1940 -0.145  20  0.139 0.144 0.144 0.144  0.961 0.992 0.995 0.996 
c1941-1945 -0.117  22  0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117  0.994 0.996 0.996 1.001 
c1946-1950 -0.029  22  0.015 0.021 0.024 0.026  0.514 0.706 0.829 0.897 
c1951-1955 -0.018  27  0.005 0.013 0.013 0.014  0.306 0.727 0.741 0.791 
c1956-1960 -0.018  29  0.002 0.007 0.012 0.013  0.091 0.390 0.667 0.721 
Incomplete secondary              
c1916-1920 0.000    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1921-1925 -0.027  27  0.004 0.023 0.023 0.023  0.144 0.829 0.829 0.829 
c1926-1930 -0.022  17  0.030 0.020 0.027 0.027  1.381 0.919 1.214 1.214 
c1931-1935 -0.245  21  0.236 0.243 0.241 0.243  0.964 0.992 0.986 0.993 
c1936-1940 -0.160  22  0.152 0.159 0.159 0.158  0.951 0.998 0.997 0.993 
c1941-1945 -0.136  23  0.129 0.132 0.132 0.133  0.948 0.974 0.977 0.982 
c1946-1950 -0.013  31  0.006 0.008 0.009 0.009  0.435 0.593 0.690 0.727 
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c1951-1955 -0.008  33  0.002 0.002 0.003 0.005  0.236 0.213 0.396 0.660 
c1956-1960 -0.016  28  0.005 0.010 0.014 0.016  0.279 0.624 0.849 0.942 
Secondary completion or more              
c1916-1920 0.000    0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1921-1925 -0.044  18  0.086 0.046 0.046 0.030  1.977 1.045 1.045 0.682 
c1926-1930 -0.045  26  0.005 0.028 0.039 0.042  0.107 0.631 0.857 0.932 
c1931-1935 -0.225  22  0.227 0.233 0.229 0.228  1.007 1.035 1.015 1.011 
c1936-1940 -0.169  23  0.168 0.175 0.176 0.175  0.991 1.034 1.041 1.034 
c1941-1945 -0.089  24  0.085 0.088 0.085 0.084  0.953 0.981 0.948 0.945 
c1946-1950 -0.016  31  0.003 0.005 0.009 0.012  0.170 0.330 0.521 0.698 
c1951-1955 -0.019  32  0.005 0.000 0.005 0.008  0.285 0.009 0.262 0.420 
c1956-1960 -0.047  26  0.024 0.043 0.047 0.046  0.512 0.916 0.989 0.971 
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Appendix 3-C. Marriage P&R Process by Education between the 1956–1960 Cohort and the 1981–1985 Cohort: Base Model 
Birth cohort Postponement (P) Age  
at the trough 
 Recuperation (R) at age  Recuperation Index (RI = Rc/Pc)  
  30 35 40 45  30 35 40 45 
Less than high school             
c1956-1960 0.000 13  0 0 0 0      
c1961-1965 -0.060 25  0.042 0.045 0.053 0.056  0.700 0.760 0.886 0.933 
c1966-1970 -0.114 26  0.017 0.052 0.077 0.093  0.150 0.457 0.680 0.815 
c1971-1975 -0.256 27  0.055 0.124 0.161   0.216 0.483 0.629  
c1976-1980 -0.377 27  0.078 0.201    0.207 0.533   
c1981-1985 -0.255 27  0.071     0.278    
High school graduation             
c1956-1960 0.000 13  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1961-1965 -0.057 24  0.054 0.046 0.052 0.055  0.954 0.821 0.925 0.976 
c1966-1970 -0.043 29  0.003 0.012 0.025 0.032  0.059 0.283 0.588 0.759 
c1971-1975 -0.105 28  0.011 0.041 0.068   0.101 0.389 0.647  
c1976-1980 -0.234 28  0.041 0.119    0.175 0.507   
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c1981-1985 -0.327 27  0.065     0.198    
Some college             
c1956-1960 0.000 13  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1961-1965 -0.076 25  0.082 0.078 0.080 0.081  1.076 1.014 1.050 1.055 
c1966-1970 -0.067 24  0.024 0.034 0.047 0.048  0.366 0.513 0.711 0.726 
c1971-1975 -0.152 27  0.043 0.084 0.104   0.283 0.553 0.681  
c1976-1980 -0.289 27  0.064 0.185    0.222 0.640   
c1981-1985 -0.378 27  0.053     0.140    
Bachelor and above             
c1956-1960 0.000 13  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1961-1965 -0.080 25  0.097 0.082 0.084 0.085  1.214 1.032 1.055 1.064 
c1966-1970 -0.067 25  0.014 0.034 0.048 0.050  0.206 0.509 0.718 0.752 
c1971-1975 -0.227 27  0.053 0.121 0.163   0.231 0.534 0.716  
c1976-1980 -0.372 28  0.084 0.229    0.225 0.614   
c1981-1985 -0.482 28  0.109     0.227    
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Appendix 3-D. Marriage P&R Process by Education between the 1956–1960 Cohort and the 1981–1985 Cohort: Relational Model  
Birth cohort Postponement (P) Age at the trough  Recuperation (R) at age  Recuperation Index (RI = R/P)  
    30 35 40 45  30 35 40 45 
Less than high school             
c1956-1960 0.000 13  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1961-1965 -0.060 25  0.042 0.045 0.053 0.056  0.700 0.760 0.886 0.933 
c1966-1970 -0.081 28  0.002 0.033 0.051 0.064  0.025 0.413 0.633 0.789 
c1971-1975 -0.142 27  0.039 0.072 0.084   0.271 0.506 0.589  
c1976-1980 -0.127 28  0.028 0.083    0.224 0.655   
c1981-1985 -0.026 19  0.140     5.455    
High school graduation             
c1956-1960 0.000 13  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1961-1965 -0.057 24  0.054 0.046 0.052 0.055  0.954 0.821 0.925 0.976 
c1966-1970 -0.039 29  0.001 0.019 0.026 0.030  0.036 0.474 0.658 0.772 
c1971-1975 -0.070 27  0.016 0.037 0.051   0.230 0.525 0.724  
c1976-1980 -0.129 28  0.030 0.078    0.236 0.602   
1
3
8
 
 139 
 
c1981-1985 -0.094 27  0.025     0.264    
Some college             
c1956-1960 0.000 13  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1961-1965 -0.076 25  0.082 0.078 0.080 0.081  1.076 1.014 1.050 1.055 
c1966-1970 -0.048 29  0.000 0.015 0.025 0.026  0.008 0.307 0.524 0.536 
c1971-1975 -0.107 27  0.040 0.071 0.077   0.371 0.666 0.724  
c1976-1980 -0.140 28  0.025 0.104    0.179 0.744   
c1981-1985 -0.105 29  0.004     0.039    
Bachelor and above             
c1956-1960 0.000 13  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
c1961-1965 -0.080 25  0.097 0.082 0.084 0.085  1.214 1.032 1.055 1.064 
c1966-1970 -0.070 30  0.000 0.035 0.047 0.048  0.000 0.496 0.668 0.691 
c1971-1975 -0.169 27  0.047 0.096 0.123   0.279 0.566 0.729  
c1976-1980 -0.149 28  0.035 0.111    0.234 0.748   
c1981-1985 -0.109 28  0.026     0.235    
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Appendix 4-A. Completed Fertility, Three Measures of Concentration, and Parity 
Distribution by Birth Cohort 
Cohort CF CR Kolm index VMR Parity distribution (%) 
0 1 2 3 4 5+ 
c1921 5.75 0.26 0.35 1.24 2.2 3.7 7.3 8.0 10.2 68.5 
c1922 5.65 0.26 0.34 1.20 2.0 4.1 5.9 10.1 10.9 66.9 
c1923 5.64 0.24 0.29 1.02 1.7 3.4 6.3 8.1 11.5 69.0 
c1924 5.48 0.26 0.31 1.15 2.3 4.5 6.7 8.3 12.8 65.5 
c1925 5.50 0.24 0.28 1.00 2.0 4.0 6.1 8.4 10.6 68.8 
c1926 5.43 0.24 0.27 0.99 1.7 4.1 5.7 8.9 11.9 67.6 
c1927 5.57 0.24 0.28 0.98 1.7 4.0 4.7 9.0 11.5 69.0 
c1928 5.39 0.23 0.25 0.92 1.5 3.4 6.4 7.9 12.8 68.0 
c1929 5.25 0.23 0.23 0.87 1.6 3.4 5.7 9.6 14.2 65.5 
c1930 5.15 0.23 0.23 0.87 2.3 3.8 4.6 8.9 15.4 64.9 
c1931 4.97 0.24 0.23 0.93 3.1 4.2 5.5 8.6 16.4 62.2 
c1932 4.83 0.24 0.22 0.89 3.0 4.0 6.4 9.5 17.6 59.5 
c1933 4.85 0.22 0.19 0.78 1.8 3.9 4.7 10.7 21.5 57.4 
c1934 4.68 0.22 0.18 0.77 2.9 3.3 5.2 11.7 21.8 55.0 
c1935 4.62 0.22 0.17 0.72 2.0 3.5 5.4 12.5 23.9 52.7 
c1936 4.30 0.23 0.16 0.74 1.5 3.7 7.8 19.8 24.7 42.4 
c1937 4.15 0.23 0.14 0.70 2.0 3.7 9.4 19.4 24.3 41.2 
c1938 4.10 0.22 0.13 0.65 1.1 3.5 10.5 21.6 25.8 37.5 
c1939 3.98 0.23 0.13 0.68 1.6 4.6 10.1 22.7 25.8 35.2 
c1940 3.85 0.23 0.13 0.66 2.0 4.6 10.8 24.5 26.5 31.7 
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c1941 3.68 0.22 0.11 0.62 2.3 4.6 11.2 28.5 27.0 26.5 
c1942 3.54 0.22 0.11 0.60 2.2 4.9 14.0 29.5 27.3 22.2 
c1943 3.40 0.22 0.10 0.59 2.0 5.0 17.0 32.2 24.5 19.3 
c1944 3.25 0.22 0.09 0.55 2.9 4.0 18.6 36.1 24.1 14.4 
c1945 3.11 0.23 0.09 0.58 3.1 5.2 22.8 34.4 21.9 12.6 
c1946 2.99 0.22 0.08 0.51 2.3 5.6 26.0 36.8 19.0 10.2 
c1947 2.91 0.22 0.07 0.48 2.0 5.8 29.3 37.8 16.1 9.1 
c1948 2.79 0.22 0.07 0.50 2.7 6.1 33.8 35.4 14.0 8.0 
c1949 2.69 0.22 0.06 0.47 2.9 6.4 36.5 35.0 13.6 5.7 
c1950 2.60 0.23 0.06 0.48 3.2 7.4 39.7 33.1 10.7 5.9 
c1951 2.48 0.22 0.06 0.46 3.1 9.9 41.8 31.4 10.5 3.4 
c1952 2.41 0.20 0.05 0.38 2.8 8.4 46.9 31.5 8.0 2.4 
c1953 2.29 0.21 0.04 0.39 3.7 9.3 52.3 26.0 6.7 2.0 
c1954 2.22 0.21 0.04 0.41 4.4 10.1 54.7 23.3 5.5 2.0 
c1955 2.15 0.20 0.04 0.38 3.9 11.6 57.7 20.8 4.7 1.3 
c1956 2.07 0.20 0.04 0.35 4.0 13.4 59.5 18.6 3.5 0.9 
c1957 1.98 0.20 0.03 0.34 5.5 13.5 62.6 15.3 2.3 0.7 
c1958 1.97 0.20 0.03 0.34 5.2 14.0 63.3 14.5 2.2 0.8 
c1959 1.92 0.19 0.03 0.31 5.1 15.4 64.5 12.6 2.1 0.2 
c1960 1.89 0.19 0.03 0.30 5.7 14.9 65.7 12.1 1.3 0.3 
c1961 1.90 0.20 0.03 0.32 6.0 15.3 64.2 12.4 1.7 0.4 
c1962 1.89 0.20 0.03 0.32 6.2 15.4 64.0 12.7 1.2 0.4 
c1963 1.90 0.20 0.03 0.33 6.8 13.9 64.5 12.8 1.6 0.3 
c1964 1.87 0.20 0.03 0.33 7.4 14.4 64.1 12.7 1.2 0.1 
  
142 
 
c1965 1.85 0.20 0.03 0.33 7.9 14.1 64.7 12.0 1.1 0.1 
c1966 1.91 0.21 0.04 0.37 6.7 15.1 62.2 13.1 2.2 0.6 
c1967 1.89 0.22 0.04 0.39 7.7 14.5 61.9 13.3 2.0 0.5 
c1968 1.87 0.22 0.03 0.37 7.6 15.7 61.2 13.1 2.1 0.3 
c1969 1.82 0.23 0.04 0.39 8.9 16.6 60.0 12.8 1.5 0.2 
c1970 1.73 0.24 0.04 0.40 9.8 20.7 57.4 10.9 1.0 0.2 
  
143 
 
Appendix 4-B. Completed Fertility, Concentration, and Parity Distribution by Five-Year Cohort and Level of Education 
 c1921-25 c1926-30 c1931-35 c1936-40 c1941-45 c1946-50 c1951-55 c1956-60 c1961-65 c1966-70 
Percent (%)           
Less than primary 65.3 50.8 30.5 16.4 8.2 3.8 2.5 1.1 0.7 0.5 
Primary 28.3 38.5 53.5 52.5 48.2 34.6 25.0 12.8 5.1 1.7 
Lower secondary 5.3 6.3 9.5 17.0 22.7 29.2 28.9 25.2 13.8 6.2 
Upper secondary 0.5 3.5 5.6 10.8 15.7 24.9 33.2 46.1 53.2 53.0 
Some college 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.3 1.6 3.9 5.5 8.5 15.5 
Bachelor or more 0.4 0.5 0.4 2.5 4.0 6.0 6.4 9.3 18.7 23.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
CF           
Less than primary 5.82 5.71 5.15 4.68 4.04 3.50 2.57 2.01 1.66 1.71 
Primary 5.31 5.16 4.83 4.29 3.73 3.18 2.65 2.21 2.05 1.99 
Lower secondary 4.80 4.65 4.14 3.63 3.14 2.71 2.30 2.05 1.97 1.91 
Upper secondary 4.07 4.19 3.72 3.18 2.80 2.44 2.10 1.91 1.89 1.90 
Some college 4.76 3.42 3.19 2.71 2.46 2.20 2.05 1.80 1.80 1.82 
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Bachelor or more 3.04 3.51 2.95 2.74 2.51 2.14 1.90 1.75 1.77 1.70 
Total 5.60 5.36 4.78 4.07 3.41 2.79 2.30 1.96 1.88 1.84 
CR           
Less than primary 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.29 0.31 0.35 0.37 
Primary 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.27 
Lower secondary 0.26 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.26 
Upper secondary 0.34 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.21 
Some college 0.29 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.23 
Bachelor or more 0.35 0.30 0.26 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.24 
Total 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.22 
Kolm Index           
Less than primary 0.32 0.28 0.24 0.19 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 
Primary 0.30 0.23 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 
Lower secondary 0.24 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 
Upper secondary 0.29 0.14 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Some college 0.30 0.12 0.09 0.06 0. 07 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
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Bachelor or more 0.17 0.18 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Total 0.31 0.25 0.20 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 
VMR           
Less than primary 1.09 0.95 0.93 0.79 0.77 0.66 0.71 0.66 0.67 0.86 
Primary 1.12 0.87 0.72 0.60 0.53 0.48 0.44 0.42 0.46 0.58 
Lower secondary 1.03 0.76 0.65 0.60 0.51 0.43 0.36 0.32 0.38 0.50 
Upper secondary 1.47 0.69 0.80 0.51 0.49 0.38 0.33 0.28 0.29 0.35 
Some college 1.32 0.72 0.57 0.47 0.55 0.38 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.41 
Bachelor or more 1.21 1.06 0.68 0.46 0.45 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.33 0.39 
Total 1.12 0.94 0.82 0.69 0.60 0.50 0.41 0.33 0.33 0.39 
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